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LIMITING SECTION 301 PREEMPTION:
THREE CHEERS FOR THE TRILOGY,
ONLY ONE FOR LINGLE AND L UECK
MICHAEL C. HARPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The three cases whose thirty year anniversary is marked by this
symposium deserve our commemoration and praise. In the Steelworkers
Trilogy' the Warren Court encouraged further a system of private order-
ing that already had flourished in the service of the goals of the federal
labor regulation from which it had been nourished. Whether or not
Dean Shulman was correct in the fifties to doubt the wisdom of judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards,2 I think the interven-
ing years have demonstrated clearly the contributions of federal regula-
tion of such enforcement to the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.3 To
be sure, these intervening years have also continued to demonstrate the
reluctance of many judges to permit unions to curtail managerial author-
ity through the use of the arbitration process.4 However, without law
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I particularly wish to thank my colleague Daniel
MacLeod for several provocative and enjoyable discussions on the topic of this essay. I also thank
Bernard Meltzer and Samuel Estreicher for their helpful substantive and editorial comments.
1. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. See Shulman, Reason, Contract; and Law in Labor Relations 68 HARV. L. REv. 999 (1955).
See also Aaron, On First Looking Into the Lincoln Mills Decision, in ARBITRATION AND THE LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, at 1
(BNA, 1959). For the contemporary opposing view, see Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal
Courts, 67 HARV. L. REv. 591, 605-606 (1954).
3. As stated by Professor Feller:
[I]t turned out, of course, that the federal judicial intervention for which Lincoln Mills
provided the premise was a protective one. The state courts, which traditionally regarded
arbitration as simply another method of adjudicating contractual controversies subject to
resolution under the general law of contracts, were intervening; what the Supreme Court
did was to use the federal jurisdiction to halt the inroads which the states had been making.
Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in ARBITRATION-1976, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, at 97, 102 (BNA, 1976).
See also C. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRA-
TORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 331 (BNA, 1980).
4. See, eg., S.D. Warren Co. v. Paperworkers Local 1069, 846 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1988); S.D.
Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, 845 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S.
992-93 (1988); Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas, 588 F. Supp. 679 (D.P.R. 1984),
aff'd, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, United Mine Workers, 720 F.2d
1365 (4th Cir. 1983); Detroit Coil v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 594 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1979); Elec-
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like that articulated in the Steelworkers Trilogy, labor arbitration could
have been much more affected by the combination of this reluctance and
the inevitable difficulty judges have not being influenced by the merits of
disputes on which they are likely to have strong views. 5 The Trilogy con-
tributed significantly to fulfilling the promise of judicial enforcement of
arbitral agreements and awards made by section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act 6 and by Lincoln Mills. 7
In the past thirty years, however, the industrial relations and em-
ployment law environment has of course been dramatically transformed.
As union density has continued to decline throughout these three de-
cades, the proportion of the American workforce that can reap any bene-
fits from the protection of industrial arbitration under collective
agreements has dwindled." Concurrently both federal and state laws pro-
viding minimum rights and guarantees to most employees, whether or
not unionized, have proliferated. In response, employers, relying in part
on the praise given arbitration in the Trilogy,9 have argued to the courts
that collective bargaining and the arbitration process require the sacrifice
or compromise of these minimum rights for unionized employees. For at
least the second half of this period the Court therefore has had to address
a very different issue from those resolved in the three 1960 Steelworkers
cases: the extent to which federal and state minimum rights and guaran-
tees should be accommodated to the system of collective bargaining and
attendant arbitration that Congress had encouraged in the federal labor
tronics Corp. of America v. Electrical Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255 (lst Cir. 1974); Torrington
v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Heinsz, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Award&" The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L.
REv. 243 (1987); Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators" Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270-77 (1980). For consideration of pre-Trilogy and thus less restrained ex-
pressions of the same strong judicial tendencies, see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1512 (1959); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through
the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1952).
5. I therefore find quixotic Professor Wellington's view that the arbitration system would be
better served if enforcing courts were not required to apply a heavy presumption in favor of an
arbitration award. See Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
471 (1962), elaborated in H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, ch. 3 (Yale 1968).
For a review of the early impact of the Trilogy on judicial intrusion on the arbitration system,
see Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges,
Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REv. 831, esp. 858-60 (1966). See also Professor Morris' approv-
ing discussion of the work of most of the circuits a decade ago in Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note
3, at 355-67.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
7. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8. The proportion of American workers represented by unions declined to just 16.4 percent of
all wage and salary employees during 1989. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at A-1 (Feb. 8,
1990) (figure from Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
9. See, eg., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580-82 (1960).
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laws. Should arbitration be protected from the judicial enforcement of
these rights and guarantees for employees covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements, as the Trilogy protects arbitration from judicial
intrusion?
In the series of cases beginning in 1974 with its Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver decision,10 the Court seemed to take a long stride toward
resolving this issue by holding that the findings of an arbitrator acting
under the authority of a collective bargaining agreement should not com-
promise an employee's capacity to press independent federal statutory
claims, even if these claims depend on some of the same issues resolved in
arbitration. 1 In Alexander and its progeny the Court considered em-
ployee claims resting on statutes enacted by the same federal legislature
that enacted the labor laws encouraging collective bargaining and arbi-
tration. But the Court's analysis indicated that it perceived no tension
between protecting the arbitration process and ensuring the grant of
equal minimum employment rights to unionized workers. The Alexan-
der Court, for instance, explained that an arbitrator "has no general au-
thority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the
parties... the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of con-
tractual rights, and this remains true regardless of whether certain con-
tractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights
secured by Title VII."'12
It therefore should not have been surprising that the Court, in the
past several years, has also declined to hold that Congress's solicitude for
the collective bargaining process requires the abrogation of state-created
minimum employment rights for employees represented by unions. The
Court has rejected dicta in a pre-Trilogy case, Teamsters Union v. Oli-
ver,13 that suggested that state law could not prevent parties to a collec-
tive agreement from establishing, at whatever level they chose, the rights
and benefits granted to employees, "a subject matter as to which federal
10. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
11. Id. (race discrimination claim under Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (minimum wage claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (first amendment claim
brought under section 1983); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987)
(personal injury action under Federal Employees Liability Act). Cf Electrical Workers, IUE, Local
790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (Title VII statute of limitation not tolled during
pendency of grievance arbitration).
12. 415 U.S. at 53-54. The Court did, however, allow that any "arbitral decision may be admit-
ted as evidence and accorded such weight as the [Title VII] court deems appropriate", and "[w]here
an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may
properly accord it great weight." Id. at 60 & n.21.
13. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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law directs them to bargain." 14 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts,'5 the Court held that a state could require employers with
collective bargaining obligations to impose "minimal substantive require-
ments on contract terms negotiated between parties to labor agree-
ments."' 6 The Court stated that it could "see no reason to believe that
... Congress intended state minimum labor standards to be treated dif-
ferently from minimum federal standards."17 More recently, in Lingle v.
Norge,' the Court held that state court enforcement of a state law right
against retaliatory discharge was not preempted by the federal labor laws
for employees covered by collective agreements containing arbitration
and unjust dismissal protection clauses, even though the state court adju-
dication might decide the same factual issues upon which arbitration for
unjust dismissal under the collective agreement would turn.' 9
Lingle, however, surely does not protect state law to the extent that
Alexander protects federal law. The Lingle Court, reaffirming its 1985
decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 20 iterated that Congress in-
tended that section 301 preempt a significant range of state law employ-
ment guarantees-those guarantees that cannot be implemented without
an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.2 ' Lueck had
found preempted the application of a state tort for bad-faith handling of
an insurance claim to an insurance plan secured in a collective bargaining
agreement. The Lingle Court stressed that the Lueck Court had appro-
priately relied on the section 301 principle first pronounced in Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co. ,22 that uniform federal law must govern the interpre-
tation of collective bargaining agreements in state as well as federal
courts.23 The Lueck Court had found that the state claim turned on a
finding of a breach of an obligation imposed by the collective agreement.
The Court had concluded that under federal section 301 law such a find-
ing could be made only by an arbitrator, in order to preserve "the central
role of arbitration in our system of industrial self-government," as se-
14. Id. at 295.
15. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
16. Id. at 754.
17. Id. at 755. See also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (upholding
Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the
event of a plant closing); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (upholding pre-ERISA
state act requiring minimum funding and vesting levels for employee pension plans).
18. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
19. Id. at 406-10.
20. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
21. 486 U.S. at 410-13.
22. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
23. 486 U.S. at 405-06.
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cured by the Trilogy.24 The Lueck plaintiff's claim thus had to be dis-
missed "for failure to make use of the grievance procedure established in
the collective-bargaining agreement."'25
After Lueck the preemption of state law claims by employees cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements seemed to spread.26 Lingle par-
tially stemmed the flow, 27 but the lower courts continue to deny
significant state law rights to unionized employees in the name of section
301 and the arbitration process that it has encouraged. 28 Many of these
lower court decisions paint a much too broad swath of section 301 pre-
emption through the range of employment rights now being made avail-
able by state law.
The fault, I suggest, lies with the preemption test suggested in Lueck
and expressly articulated in Lingle. Both cases were correctly decided on
their facts, but neither adequately explained why either the need for uni-
form federal law governing the interpretation of collective agreements or
protection of the arbitration process requires preemption of some state
law claims. The result has been a section 301 preemption test that has
confused and misled the lower courts.
I will also argue in this essay that the Court's difficulty with section
301 preemption in part derives from its failure to confront directly how
the grant of certain minimum rights to unionized employees may conflict
with federal labor policies supporting labor law preemption doctrine in
addition to that applied through section 301. In particular, I wish to
suggest that although the broad dicta of the Oliver case has been rightly
rejected by the Court, Oliver does suggest a principle that should help
define those state laws that might impair the free processes of collective
bargaining that have been encouraged through the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.29 I will contend that by widening its preemption focus the
Court could have more convincingly decided not only Lueck, but even
more clearly its 1990 United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson case,30
24. 471 U.S. at 219 (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581).
25. 471 U.S. at 221 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)).
26. See Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insurance: The
Erosion ofIndividual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596, 639-644 (1987).
27. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 92 and 93 infra.
28. See, e.g., cases cited at note 94 infra.
29. This form of preemption is now referred to as "Machinists preemption" by the Court-see,
e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749-51 (1985)-because of the
decision in Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), which held
that a state's penalization of certain conduct that is neither prohibited or protected by the Labor
Act, may still be inconsistent with the Act because it upsets "the balance of power between labor and
management" anticipated by Congress. Id. at 146 (quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260
(1964)).
30. 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990).
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involving a state tort claim against a union for negligently performing
mine safety inspections. Widening its focus would also allow the Court
to articulate doctrine that would more effectively control lower court
frustration of organized employees' invocations of state law rights that
do not significantly impede the collective bargaining process.
Before making these arguments, however, I want to return to a brief
review of the Trilogy. Doing so seems appropriate not only because of
the anniversary marked by this symposium, but also because the content
and justifications for the section 301 law fashioned in these three cases
provides an illuminating background for understanding how the Court
should be fashioning section 301 preemption law.
II. THE WISDOM OF THE TRILOGY
It is important to recall exactly why the presumptions in favor of
arbitration established by the Trilogy are appropriate and of what they
consist. The historical setting should first be noted. By 1960 industrial
arbitration was of course well developed and almost ubiquitous in union-
ized shops.31 It had become one of the crowning achievements of the
American labor movement: an effective means by which unions could
secure the enforcement of the restrictions on managerial discretion for
which they had fought so hard in rounds of collective bargaining over the
prior two or three decades. Arbitration certainly offered clear advan-
tages to unions over dependence on direct judicial enforcement. It was of
course cheaper and quicker than litigation, but more importantly, it pro-
vided privately chosen decisionmakers to replace a judiciary that most
union leaders had good reason to fear and distrust. Furthermore, it
seemed both generally acceptable to management, and consistent with
the national labor policy, because it served as an effective alternative to
industrial conflict in general and strikes over the interpretation and en-
forcement of collective agreements in particular. The decision of the
Court in Lincoln Mills to interpret section 301 to permit federal court
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate thus had seemed to promise un-
ions a constructive use of the judicial injunctive power that had so often
been used against them in the past.32
The Steelworkers Trilogy helped secure that promise by using sec-
tion 301 lawmaking authority to articulate a series of presumptions about
31. See L. KELLER, THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: A POSITIVE APPROACH TO LABOR RE-
LATIONS 256 (BNA 1963); 2 B.N.A. Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Cont. Sery. No. 51.6
(Aug. 26, 1965).
32. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Forbath,
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989).
[Vol. 66:685
LIMITING SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
the meaning of arbitration clauses secured by unions in collective agree-
ments. In American Manufacturing the Court held that agreements to
arbitrate disputes concerning the application of a collective bargaining
agreement should be presumed to include even those claims that a court
deems to be frivolous. 33 In Warrior & Gulf the Court held that such
agreements to arbitrate should also be presumed to cover any claim that
a collective bargaining agreement has been breached unless the agree-
ment expressly excludes that claim from the reach of the arbitration
clause-unless "the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration" can be presented. 34 Finally, in Enterprise Wheel
the Court held that agreements to arbitrate should be presumed to antici-
pate judicial enforcement of any arbitration award that is based on an
arbitrator's construction of a collective agreement. 35
It is critical to understanding both the meaning and wisdom of the
Trilogy to note that each of these holdings only establishes presumptions
about the meaning of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agree-
ments. Each of these presumptions is fully rebuttable by clear language
that expresses the desire of a contracting union and employer to further
curtail the authority of the arbitrator.36 This may be most obvious for
the presumption in favor of substantive arbitrability pronounced in War-
rior & Gulf; the Court there directly stated that courts should not force
parties to arbitrate matters that they had expressly excluded from the
scope of arbitration.37 But it also must be true for the presumptions
33. 363 U.S. at 568.
34. 363 U.S. at 584-85. Warrior & Gulf of course also held that it was for the courts to deter-
mine the scope of the arbitration obligation by application of this presumption. Id. at 582-83.
35. 363 U.S. at 598.
36. Professor Wellington's claim that the Trilogy "undercut the freedom of contract goal of the
Labor-Management Relations Act" therefore seems off the mark. See WELLINGTON, LABOR AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 5, at 112. Judge Hays, by contrast, was correct about this much
concerning the meaning of the Trilogy.
In other words, as a practical matter, arbitration and the collective agreement are what Mr.
Justice Douglas says they are if, and only if, the labor unions want them to be that way...
and they can at the same time induce, or force, the employer to agree. As long as collective
bargaining remains free, all the labor relations experts, the law professors, the arbitrators,
and the Supreme Court Justices will not be able to change that.
Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 924 (1960).
Professor Feller's vision of the labor arbitration system and the collective bargaining agreement
on which it rests, see Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663 (1973), may be both normatively and descriptively compelling. However, Professor St.
Antoine is certainly correct to suggest that whatever one thinks of this vision, or any rival vision,
neither academics, arbitrators or even courts have authority to impose it on particular parties negoti-
ating a particular agreement. See St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Sec-
ond Look At Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. Rv. 1137, 1139-40 (1977).
37. The specific question in Warrior & Gulf was whether the employer's decision to contract
out some bargaining unit work was subject to arbitration. The Court held that it was, because the
agreement did not expressly exclude contracting out decisions from the scope of the arbitration
1990]
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against judicial involvement in pre-arbitral (American Manufacturing) or
post-arbitral (Enterprise Wheel) review of the merits of a claim of a
breach of a collective agreement. Nothing in either decision suggests
that parties to collective agreements could not provide for a system of
judicial screening or review of the merits of arbitration claims or awards.
In each of these decisions, as in Warrior & Gulf, the Court is exercising
the only power that it is granted by section 301-the power to develop
federal law to enforce private contracts between an employer and a labor
organization. Nothing in section 301, or in the federal common-law
making power inferred from this section in Lincoln Mills and its progeny,
authorizes the Court to demand that employers and unions contract for
any particular procedures. 38 The Triology, like other section 301 cases
decided by the Court, are efforts to explain what unions and employers
might agree upon and how; they do not in any way dictate what collec-
tive bargaining agreements must include. 39 As explained by Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion for American Manufacturing and
Warrior & Gulf, "the arbitration promise is itself a contract. The parties
are free to make that promise as broad or as narrow as they wish, for
there is no compulsion in law requiring them to include any such
promises in their agreement." 4
The Steelworkers Trilogy is thus significant not because it requires
process. However, the Court allowed that a "specific collective bargaining agreement may exclude
contracting out from the grievance procedure. Or a written collateral agreement may make clear
that contracting out was not a matter for arbitration." 363 U.S. at 584.
38. The unadorned language of section 301(a) should be remembered:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such
labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
The Lincoln Mills Court teased this language to find "that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of... collective bargaining agreements ...." 353 U.S. 448,
451 (1957). It certainly did not, however, go so far as to find some implied authority to dictate the
terms of collective agreements. Doing so would have been contrary to the encouragement of private
ordering in collective agreements that is a central element of the federal labor policy. See, e.g., H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1970) ("While the parties' freedom of contract is not
absolute under the [Labor] Act, allowing the [Labor] Board to compel agreement when the parties
themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-
private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official com-
pulsion over the actual terms of the contract .... it is the job of Congress, not the Board or the
courts, to decide when and if it is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective-
bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's demands.").
39. As the Court has recently expressly reiterated, the Warrior & Gulf rule that the courts are
to decide the scope of the agreement to arbitrate is also only a presumption, reversible by agreement
of the parties. See AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) ("Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court not the arbitrator.") (emphasis supplied).
40. 363 U.S. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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employers to accept a substantial level of arbitral authority, but rather
because it enables unions to secure that authority through private agree-
ment with minimal bargaining costs. The Trilogy makes clear that judi-
cial authority can be restricted, even if it must not be. Equally
important, the Trilogy minimizes the transaction costs of agreeing to
such a restriction of judicial authority by providing that it is to be pre-
sumed from an agreement to submit disputes over the application of a
collective agreement to arbitration. Absent the Trilogy's presumptions,
parties to collective bargaining would be uncertain what they would need
to do to allocate particular authority to arbitrators. Case-by-case judicial
probing of the intent of particular parties regarding arbitral authority
would generate increased litigation as well as increased bargaining costs.
Of course the Court could have used its section 301 lawmaking
power to fashion other presumptions, or mutable contract "default"
rules,4t that would have reduced uncertainty over the creation of arbitral
authority, and thus potential bargaining and transaction costs. For in-
stance, the Court could have held in American Manufacturing and Enter-
prise Wheel, that absent express language precluding judicial
consideration of the merits of arbitral claims and awards, agreements to
arbitrate should be presumed to anticipate judicial screening both of
claims for frivolity before arbitration and also of awards for reasonable-
ness after arbitration. Such presumptions might have been overridden
without especially difficult bargaining as long as the Court was clear con-
cerning the type of contractual language necessary to do So. 4 2 Further-
more, if bargaining costs are not significant, the direction of the
presumption over the division of arbitral and judicial authority should
make little difference as to how contracting parties decide to make that
division.43 If expansive arbitral authority is more valuable to a union
than expansive judicial authority is to an employer, it should be traded
for in negotiations, regardless of whether it is presumed to exist-at least
as long as there is certainty about how the trade can be made and no
special transaction costs.44
41. See generally Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
42. Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 41, at 121-23 (criticizing Supreme Court real estate con-
tract decision for failing to establish clearly how contractual presumption it pronounced could be
circumvented).
43. The leading cite for this proposition is of course Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). However, for an excellent elaboration, stressing Coase's realization that high trans-
action costs occur in the normal, rather than exceptional case, see Ellickson, The Case for Coase and
Against "Coaseanism" 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989).
44. Moreover, given that the underlying agreement to arbitrate is itself a creation of a negotia-
tion between the parties, it can be argued that the direction of the presumption about the division of
1990]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, there is good reason to commend the particular pre-
sumptions established in the Trilogy. First, it is probable that the costs of
bargaining are often sufficiently large to make a difference. Collective
bargaining is a complicated, dynamic process that we cannot be confident
of fully understanding. 45 It is certainly possible that in some cases the
cost of bargaining around a presumption that does not accurately reflect
the level of arbitral authority the parties would have chosen in the ab-
sence of bargaining costs would result in the acceptance of the subop-
timal level of arbitral authority embodied in the presumption.46 In those
cases the presumption would frustrate the parties ability to achieve a
contractual arrangement that is most satisfying to them. Contractual
presumptions, like those expressed in the Trilogy, thus may not only re-
duce bargaining and litigation costs, they may also impose extra costs
because of their potential rigidity. Such presumptions may be warranted
only if they reflect what usually would be the intent of the parties in the
absence of specific controlling language.47  Yet I think that the three
arbitral and judicial authority should also have no distributional consequences. See, e.g., Leslie,
Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REV. 241, 252-53 (1989) (contractual "gap-fillers" or
presumptions theoretically have no distributive consequences for consensual bargaining). However,
some empirical work suggests that contract presumptions in bilateral monopolies like those imposed
by collective bargaining can have significant distributive effects, perhaps because they force parties
wishing to reverse them to signal their importance. See Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract
Presumptions, 17 J. L. STUD. 237 (1988).
45. Consider again the description of the collective bargaining agreement in Warrior & Gulf,
363 U.S. at 580-81:
The mature labor agreement may attempt to regulate all aspects of the complicated rela-
tionship, from the most crucial to the most minute over an extended period of time. Be-
cause of the compulsion to reach agreement and the breadth of the matters covered, as well
as the need for a fairly concise and readable instrument, the product of negotiations (the
written document) is, in the words of the late Dean Shulman, "a compilation of diverse
provisions: some provide objective criteria almost automatically applicable, some provide
more or less specific standards which require reason and judgment in their application; and
some do little more than leave problems to future consideration with an expression of hope
and good faith." [Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999, 1005 (1955).] Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the
particular industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement. Many of the spe-
cific practices which underlie the agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form, even to
the negotiators.
46. See Leslie, supra note 44, at 254-58 for one discussion of plausible transaction costs in
collective bargaining.
47. Most commentators on presumptive or default rules erected by the law to govern various
private economic relationships have argued that these rules should be fashioned to give parties what
they would have wanted in the absence of bargaining costs. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals for Prod-
ucts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 361 (1988); Baird & Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985); Goetz &
Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV.
967, 971 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transaction, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702
(1982). But see Ayres and Gertner, supra, note 41 (arguing that default rules should sometimes be
chosen to force a party to disclose information).
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Steelworkers decisions correctly divined the normal expectations of the
parties to arbitration agreements in labor contracts.
This seems to me especially clear for the American Manufacturing
and Enterprise Wheel presumptions against judicial screening and review
of the merits of arbitration claims and awards. Arbitration had devel-
oped prior to Lincoln Mills and the Trilogy without such judicial involve-
ment. It is hard to believe that many unions or employers sincerely
interested in maintaining a viable arbitration process would have wanted
to burden it with the expense and time of judicial screening and review.
Certainly union leaders, frustrated by the historical general lack of sym-
pathy in the judiciary to collective labor action and its fruits,48 would
have been unlikely to think that they had bargained for such restraints on
the arbitral authority they had worked to secure. Justice Douglas was
surely correct to assert for the American Manufacturing Court that the
Steelworkers bargained only for the judgment of an arbitrator, not for
that of a court.49
Moreover, hindsight provides even clearer vision on the presump-
tions established by this two thirds of the Trilogy. In the decades since
the Trilogy, collective bargaining agreements rarely have included clauses
purporting to grant courts authority either to screen grievances on the
merits before ordering arbitration, or to review rendered arbitration
awards on their merits.50 As far as I can discern, there has been little
litigation that reflects an attempt to contract around the American Man-
ufacturing and Enterprise Wheel presumptions limiting judicial review of
the merits of a grievance. 5' I doubt whether the costs of bargaining
about these presumptions could be so high as to inhibit even such at-
tempts if the presumptions did not reflect what is at least now the almost
unanimous intent of the parties to arbitration agreements about the ap-
propriate degree of judicial control over those agreements.
The presumption of an expansive scope of arbitration pronounced in
the third case in the Trilogy, Warrior & Gulf, is of course frequently qual-
48. See WELLINGTON, supra note 5, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, at 96-97.
49. 363 U.S. at 568-69. See also Professor St. Antoine's description of arbitrators as designated
contract readers in St. Antoine, supra note 36, and Professor Feller's description of the arbitration
system as an independent political jurisdiction in Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden
Age, supra note 3.
50. Certainly the early dire predictions about the effect of the Trilogy on employer acceptance
of arbitration, see Levitt, The Supreme Court and Arbitration, N.Y.U. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR, 217, 237, have proved inaccurate.
51. There has of course been much litigation about the meaning of these limits, especially the
limit on judicial review of a completed arbitration. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra. See also
Int'l Union of Elec., Radio, and Machine Workers v. General Electric, 407 F.2d 253, cert. denied,
395 U.S. 904 (1969).
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ified in collective agreements by the inclusion of clauses that expressly
remove certain topics from the reach of arbitral authority. Moreover, as
Justice Brennan stressed in his concurring opinion, Warrior & Gulf was
also a more difficult case on its facts; 52 the arbitration agreement did
expressly exclude "matters which are strictly a function of manage-
ment," and the employer might well have hoped ex ante, at the time the
agreement was negotiated, that subcontracting of work was encompassed
by this exception.53
Still I think the Warrior & Gulf Court fashioned the best possible
doctrine by requiring the employer to specifically list those matters that
might be covered by the agreement but that are not subject to arbitration.
As the Warrior & Gulf Court recognized, allowing employers to argue
that exemptions are implicit in bargaining history or in other dealings
between the parties could lead to the judicial consideration of the merits
of arbitral claims that most parties to collective agreements do not in-
tend.54 It could, moreover, lead to uncertain and attendant bargaining
and litigation costs.55 Since Warrior & Gulf, employers know what they
must do to avoid arbitration on particular topics; what they must obtain
in negotiations should be clear. I am not convinced that when obtaining
an exemption from arbitration on a topic is more valuable to an employer
than maintaining arbitral control is valuable to a union, employers have
much difficulty purchasing the exemption in negotiations.5 6
By contrast, a presumption of a narrower scope of arbitration might
not be so easy to contract around. A presumption that nothing is cov-
ered by arbitration that is not specifically mentioned in the arbitration
clause would carry the risk that the parties would neglect to specify some
obligation implicit in the agreement that would not therefore be subject
to arbitral resolution. As the Warrior & Gulf example of contracting out
bargaining unit work illustrates, this could result in rendering arbitration
ineffective against the erosion of the entire basis of the agreement.5 7 I
52. 363 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. It was thus the Warrior & Gulf presumption about the broad scope of arbitral authority
that provoked the most criticism of the Trilogy. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 50, at 230.
54. 363 U.S. at 585.
55. Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 41, at 117 (noting the major costs of tailoring a default rule
to what the court thinks the individual parties would have wanted, rather than to what most parties
would want).
56. There admittedly might be cases where an employer's request for exclusion of an issue from
arbitration would upset delicate negotiations on other issues, even when the exclusion is more valua-
ble to the employer than arbitral control would be to the union. Pareto optimality is not always
easily reached in multi-issue negotiations. However, as a bargaining relationship matures and con-
tinues through a number of negotiation rounds, most "imperfections" should be able to be
eliminated.
57. 363 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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think this risk is much greater than the risk that parties neglect to men-
tion some matter that they do not want subject to arbitration under the
actual Warrior & Gulf rule. Employers of course are more likely to have
knowledge about some future controversial exercise of managerial power,
such as subcontracting, than are unions. A presumption against arbi-
trability thus would enable employers to more frequently benefit by the
"strategic" behavior of purposefully avoiding express resolution of a pos-
sible matter of controversy than unions are able to benefit by analogous
behavior under the Warrior & Gulf presumption. Forcing employers to
specify potential matters of controversy by requesting an exemption from
a general presumption of arbitrability is therefore more likely to lead to
efficient bargaining. 58
There is another important consideration that supports both the
presumption in favor of arbitration expressed in Warrior & Gulf, and also
the presumptions in favor of arbitral authority, expressed in the other
two Steelworkers cases. The risk that bargaining rigidities will subject
parties to a collective agreement to more arbitral authority than they
might have chosen free of presumptions is less significant in light of fed-
eral labor policy than the risk that parties will be able to invoke less
arbitral authority than they thought they had secured. As stressed
above, 59 federal labor policy cannot impose a form of dispute resolution
on unions and employers through section 301 law. Since section 301 law
concerns contract interpretation, the intent of contracting parties must
trump any interpretive presumptions expressed by that law. But the
Steelworkers Trilogy illustrates how federal labor policy nonetheless sup-
plies the content of the interpretive presumptions.
As Justice Douglas explained for the Warrior & Gulf Court: "The
present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective bargaining agreement .... A major factor in achieving indus-
trial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in
the collective bargaining agreement." 6 Arbitration contributes to indus-
58. As Bernard Meltzer pointed out to me, there may be cases in which a union that has formu-
lated a future grievance strategy at the time of negotiations, knows better than an employer which
exercises of managerial power will be at issue in future arbitration controversies. Even in such in-
stances, however, employers are not ignorant of their own future potentially controversial uses of
power.
The argument that default rules should sometimes be chosen to discourage the "strategic" and
inefficient nondisclosure of information by one type of party to private agreements is developed in
Ayres and Gertner, supra note 41, at 97-107. See also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 799, 805-06 (1941) (contract rules may be justified by their function of forcing parties to
focus on certain topics).
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60. 363 U.S. at 578.
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trial peace and thus to the goals of the national labor policy because it is
the substitute for strikes and other labor unrest, not for other forms of
adjudication in court.6' Justice Douglas may have incorrectly assumed
that if a dispute is not subject to arbitration, it also will always not be
subject to any contractual obligation not to strike. 62 But he surely must
also have understood that employees denied a forum for their contractual
claim are much more likely to resort to strikes or other economic action,
whether or not this action is prohibited by their collective agreement.
The federal labor policy similarly supports the American Manufac-
turing and Enterprise Wheel presumptions. The fully plausible assump-
tion can be made that employees frustrated either by judicial denial of
their access to an arbitral forum or by judicial refusal to enforce the suc-
cess that they achieved at such a forum are much more likely to resort to
aggressive economic action. Adjudication before neutral tribunals cho-
sen in part by the employees' representatives offers an opportunity to
ventilate and defuse disputes, as long as the legitimacy of this adjudica-
tory process is accepted and maintained by the courts. Judicial rejection
of the outcome of the process on the other hand is likely to lead to fur-
ther frustration and polarization at the workplace.
This use of section 301 presumptive rules to channel the parties to-
ward arbitration might be supported by either paternalistic or externality
concerns. Our national labor policy may view arbitration as a more criti-
cal alternative to work stoppages than do many parties at the time of
contract negotiations, either because the parties cannot anticipate their
own long run interests, or because work stoppages have effects on third
parties not accounted for by contracting employers and unions. These
concerns can be over weighed where the parties to a collective agreement
are willing to incur the costs of bargaining around the presumptions of
the Trilogy; but if the concerns are worth at least as much as the costs of
such bargaining, they can alone justify the presumptions. 63
The above analysis of the meaning and wisdom of the Trilogy
teaches several lessons of relevance to understanding how the Court
might best articulate section 301 preemption of state employment laws.
61. Id. See also Feller, supra note 3, at 100 ("That is the true meaning of the famous, and not
quite accurate, statement in the Warrior & Gulfopinion that arbitration is the quid pro quo for the
agreement not to strike. A more accurate phrasing would put it that arbitration is a substitute for
the strike.").
62. See 363 U.S. at 578 n.3 (citing Lincoln Mills for the proposition that the arbitration alterna-
tive is the "quid pro quo" for an agreement not to strike).
63. Cf. Ayres and Gertner, supra note 41, at 125 ("... if a certain type of contract generates a
mild externality, we may want to discourage most [but not all] people from entering this type of
contract.").
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First, the Steelworkers cases all provide examples of the Court using its
section 301 authority to interpret collective bargaining agreements to es-
tablish revocable presumptions about what parties to collective agree-
ments intend. These cases may channel such parties toward greater
arbitral authority, but they do not require it.64 This model should apply
to nearly all section 301 law, which is concerned only with the interpreta-
tion of a contractual agreement. 65 Even the Lincoln Mills-Lucas Flour
rule directing that federal law govern the interpretation of collective
agreements in both federal and state courts should be able to be circum-
vented by parties to particular collective agreements through clear con-
tractual language stating the parties' intent that state law govern
interpretations. Such language should effectively incorporate the state
law as the section 301 federal law used by both federal and state courts.
Second, the particular presumptions established in these cases illus-
trate how uniform section 301 law can facilitate collective bargaining.
One advantage of the law made by the Trilogy is simply that it is clear
and consistent law that bargaining partners can easily understand will
apply to their collective agreement unless it is expressly qualified in some
manner. Third, the particular presumptions of the Trilogy probably fa-
cilitate the efficient bargaining that Congress presumably would have de-
sired. This seems true because the presumptions either express the
almost universal intent of parties to collective agreements (American
Manufacturing and Enterprise Wheel) or because they place the burden
of carving out exceptions on employers who are more likely to know
what possible exceptions warrant special attention (Warrior & Gulf).
Fourth, the particular presumptions of the Trilogy can also be justi-
fied as an encouragement of the arbitral authority that seems to serve the
federal labor laws' central goal of industrial peace. It is important to
stress, however, that the presumptions may contribute to this goal by
64. This analysis answers those, like Professor Meltzer, see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbi-
trability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 464, 476-77 (1961), and Wellington, supra
note 5, who expressed concern that the Trilogy imposes more arbitral authority than that for which
parties contract in collective bargaining. The Court in the Trilogy reads the national labor policy to
value peaceful arbitration sufficiently highly to impose the costs of bargaining on those who wish to
avoid it.
65. One exception is the rule announced in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), permitting
individual employees to sue employers for breaches of collective agreements when a union fails to
discharge its duty of fair representation by refusing to process a grievance. This exception may be
justified because of the inherent conflict of interest between union bargaining agents and employees
concerning the effect of union breaches of representational duties. Exceptions are not required for
rules that are not likely to be abrogated by unions in conflict with the interests of employees. See.
e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) (". . . unless the contract provides
otherwise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on
his behalf.") (emphasis supplied).
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providing a legitimate alternative mechanism by which employees can
secure the restrictions on managerial authority for which they have bar-
gained. Court adjudication might also provide such an alternative, but it
may not be as legitimate given the nature of judges and how they are
selected, and it generally is not as fast or inexpensive.
III. SECTION 301 PREEMPTION UNDER LINGLE AND LUECK
A. One Cheer For Lingle
The Lingle decision 66 should be praised for rejecting one model of
section 301 preemption, and criticized for positing another. The Lingle
Court unanimously reversed a Seventh Circuit decision that had held
preempted Jonna Lingle's claim that she had been discharged in retalia-
tion for filing an Illinois workers' compensation claim.67 The circuit
court had recognized that the Illinois courts had both developed a state
law cause of action for retaliatory discharge to protect the Illinois work-
ers' compensation system,68 and had extended that cause of action to all
Illinois employees regardless of their alternative protection by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.69 Relying in part on its own precedents as
well as some from other circuits,70 the Seventh Circuit nonetheless held
that Lingle's state law claim had to be treated as a claim for wrongful
discharge under the collective agreement covering her employment. The
court stressed the section 301-Lucas Flour principle that one uniform
body of federal law must govern the interpretation of such agreements.7 '
It reasoned that since "the just cause provision in the collective bargain-
ing agreement may well prohibit such retaliatory discharge," the claim
could have been brought under the collective agreement. The court fur-
ther emphasized that an independent state law claim for retaliatory dis-
charge "implicates the same analysis of the facts" as would a claim
before an arbitrator under the just cause provision of the agreement. 72
The Supreme Court expressly rejected these section 301 preemption
66. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
67. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987).
68. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IIl. 2d 172, 23 Ill. Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (dis-
cussed at 823 F.2d at 1035).
69. See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Il. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 909 (1985); Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit Dist., 113 Ill. 2d 545, 499 N.E.2d 435
(1986) (both discussed at 823 F.2d at 1036).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986); Bale v. General Tele-
phone Co. of California, 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Inc., 772 F.2d
342 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d
511 (7th Cir. 1985).
71. 823 F.2d at 1042-46.
72. Id. at 1046.
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standards. The Lingle Court found irrelevant whether what the state law
prohibits is also prohibited by a collective agreement and whether the
state law cause of action requires analysis of the same set of facts that
might be analyzed by an arbitrator resolving a dispute under the collec-
tive agreement. 73 The Court held that state law claims that can be re-
solved without interpretation of a collective agreement cannot be
preempted by section 301. 74
The Court's rejection of the Seventh Circuit's standards was clearly
correct. As stressed in the above discussion of the Trilogy, section 301
does no more than establish the foundation for a system to interpret the
meaning of collective bargaining agreements. Section 301 preemption
derives from the pronouncement in Lucas Flour that this system requires
that the same uniform body of law apply in state as well as federal courts.
The discussion of the Trilogy indicated why Congress might have wanted
such uniformity: it facilitates collective bargaining by providing the par-
ties with greater certainty about what they are negotiating.75 State law
that provides additional meaning to something negotiated in a collective
agreement might be preempted by federal section 301 law in order to
maintain uniformity. However, state law like that of the Illinois law at
issue in Lingle, which is applicable to employees regardless of whether
they are covered by any kind of collective agreement, cannot possibly
threaten the uniformity of section 301 interpretive principles or the clari-
fied collective bargaining they promote. The Illinois retaliatory dis-
charge tort on which Lingle relied does not force an employer or union
negotiating a collective agreement for an Illinois bargaining unit to be
concerned that something they include in the agreement will impose
some additional duty on the employer or expose it to additional potential
remedies. The duty and potential remedies created by this tort will con-
front Illinois employers whether or not they even negotiate an
agreement.
Courts and commentators have argued that allowing state causes of
73. 486 U.S at 406-10.
74. Id. at 413.
75. As explained in Lucas Flour:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state
and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the
rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be
made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provi-
sions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law
which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargaining
agreement was made the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under compet-
ing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation.
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
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action like that of Lingle's will cause fewer labor disputes to be resolved
by the arbitration process. The Seventh Circuit in Lingle, for instance,
asserted that the preemption of the Illinois retaliatory discharge tort was
necessary to serve the federal policy of protecting the arbitration process
from judicial encroachment, 76 a policy that I have just noted is at least a
partial explanation of the Steelworkers' presumptions. The Seventh Cir-
cuit announced that Congress "envisioned" arbitration to be an "exclu-
sive" process and suggested that use of arbitration to resolve labor
disputes would decline to the extent unionized employees could obtain
relief by pressing state claims against discharges. 77 The court also argued
that allowing state law claims like that of Lingle's to proceed could make
unions seem less necessary and thus could even inhibit the union organi-
zation on which the proliferation of the arbitration system promoted by
section 301 law depends. 78
But such arguments do not make a compelling case against the
Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit. First, none of these
arguments has anything to do with the basis for section 301 preemption
first established in Lucas Flour. Although the arguments appeal to a pol-
icy (the encouragement of arbitration) that has influenced the develop-
ment of section 301 law, they do not concern the meaning of collective
bargaining agreements and thus are not themselves relevant to the task of
section 301-developing a uniform body of principles to interpret collec-
tive agreements. If Congress had wanted to preempt any state law claim
based on a controversy that conceivably could be resolved through arbi-
tration, Congress' purpose would not have been to insure that one body
of law govern the interpretation of collective agreements.
Moreover, the possibility that Congress has had this intent is much
too slim to justify the development of some new preemption principle
based directly on achieving some preeminence for arbitration.79 Given
76. 823 F.2d at 1046-47. See also, e.g., Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedie"
Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149,
1170-73 (1990); White, Section 301's Preemption Of State Law Claims A Model For Analysis, 41
ALA. L. REV. 377, 386-88 (1990); Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Dis-
charge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 30-31 (1986).
77. 823 F.2d at 1046.
78. Id. at 1047. See also Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies For Wrongful Discharge
In The Aftermath Of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent Or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D.L.
REV. 63, 96 (1989).
79. Such a principle also would fit with neither of the two other labor law preemption doctrines
that have been established by the Court. First, the availability of private arbitration as an alternative
remedy for individual employees does not mean that the state law they invoke threatens the primary
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board by protecting activity that is also arguably pro-
tected by the National Labor Relations Act. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959). Second, providing individual employees state law remedies for employer actions
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the values of federalism and Congress' clear decision not to oust states
completely from the regulation of the workplace, we should demand
some clear indication that Congress anticipated such a broad preemption
principle. No such indication can be found in statutory language or leg-
islative history.80 Congress' failure to exempt employees protected by
collective agreements and arbitration clauses from its own federal mini-
mum rights legislation"1 indeed suggests that Congress has been fully
comfortable with having arbitration provide less than an exclusive
remedy.
Congressional acquiescence in the Steelworkers Trilogy promotion of
arbitration also provides no basis for protecting some exclusive domain
for arbitration from state encroachment. As explained above, the Trilogy
established only presumptions about the intent of parties to collective
agreements; it did not require unions and employers to accept arbitration
as an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, the Trilogy en-
couraged arbitration as an alternative to strikes and other weapons of
industrial disruption, not as an alternative to orderly judicial adjudica-
tion of independent state law claims. The Trilogy protected arbitration
from being thwarted or aborted by judicial determinations that arbitra-
tion claims had little merit. None of the three Steelworkers' cases had
anything to do with preventing alternative judicial claims that do not
obstruct the independent operation of the arbitration system.
Furthermore, there are critical flaws in all the claims that any fed-
eral policy to encourage arbitration will be impaired by the provision of
alternative state law remedies for employer actions that might be chal-
lenged under arbitration clauses. The claim that such remedies must be
preempted in order to avoid the discouragement of the successful union
organizing efforts on which arbitration depends is most clearly flawed. It
is plausible that the recent spread of state law remedies for wrongful dis-
charge makes it more difficult for union organizers to convince some em-
ployees of the need to be represented by a union. 2 But any such effect
that also might be remedied through arbitration does not upset the balanced collective bargaining
process for which Congress provided in the Labor Act. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) and infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
80. Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) is not an adequate basis
for this principle. Section 203(d) only provides that "[final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." (emphasis
supplied).
81. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Neumann & Rissman, Where Have All the Union Members Gone?, 2 J. LAB.
ECON. 175 (1984) (contending that empirical data indicates union membership decline as a result of
judicial exceptions to employment-at-will doctrine). But see Hauserman & Maranto, The Union
Substitution Hypothesis Revisited: Do Judicially Created Exceptions to the Termination-At- Will Doc-
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can only be aggravated-not mitigated-by law that announces to em-
ployees that selection of a union will result in the loss of these state law
remedies.8 3 Thus, a union discouragement hypothesis might provide
support to the preemption of state law that denied employment protec-
tions to unionized employees, not a law that gave the same protections to
union and nonunion employees alike.84
Any claim that state causes of action may inhibit arbitrators' in-
dependent resolution of factually parallel controversies also seems dubi-
ous. Given the relative speed of arbitration, any employee who is able to
press concurrently a grievance to arbitration and a factually parallel state
law claim is almost certain to have the arbitration decided first. Waiting
to press the grievance to arbitration until a state court has ruled would
generally not be feasible because of the limitations periods set out in col-
lective agreements to govern arbitration.85
It is probably true that the availability of state law remedies for
wrongful discharge will result in a somewhat reduced use of the arbitra-
tion remedy.8 6 However, this should not be a concern for the federal
labor law system. As just noted, section 301 law encourages arbitration
as an effective and accepted alternative to work disruptions. Judicial en-
forcement of restrictions on managerial power secured in collective
agreements is assumed to not provide such an alternative because unions
and employees generally view it as too protracted, expensive, and per-
trine Hurt Unions?, 72 MARQ. L. Rv. 317 (1989) (exposing flaws in the Neumann & Rissman
study).
83. See also Herman, supra note 26, at 647-50 & n.263. It therefore is difficult to understand
why a union lawyer would want the claims of the employees his clients represents to be preempted.
See Gould, Hay, Rosenfeld, When State And Federal Laws Collide: Preemption-Nightmare or Op-
portunity, 9 INDUs. REL. L.J. 4, 24-27 (1987) (remarks of union lawyer Rosenfeld). Perhaps there is
a concern that incumbent unions' ability to control and discipline represented employees is impaired
by the availability of alternative state law remedies, access to which cannot be screened by the union.
Control of employees through discriminatory access to the grievance system is not the kind of union
control that the labor laws are to encourage, however, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (arbi-
trary handling of grievance constitutes actionable breach of union's duty of fair representation); nor
is it likely to lead to a healthy and growing labor movement.
One commentator, hoping to retain exclusive union control over discharge grievances of repre-
sented employees, but also recognizing that denying remedies to union workers could impair organi-
zational efforts, has advocated that section 301 law be clarified to insure the permissibility of
arbitrators granting punitive as well as compensatory damages. See Korn, supra note 76, at 1184-94.
Such clarification, however, would not insure that employers would be willing to accept collective
bargaining agreements that permitted such damages for wrongful discharge.
84. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
85. See BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CoNTRAmcTS 34 (BNA) (12th ed. 1989).
86. I would not deny that the hegemony of arbitration is challenged by independent state and
federal employment laws. See Feller, supra note 3. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that
union employees would always prefer state law remedies to those of arbitration. For instance, there
are reasons, such as ease of proof, expense, and arbitral use of the reinstatement remedy, why em-
ployees would sometimes prefer to arbitrate rather than litigate a retaliatory discharge claim such as
that of Lingle's. See Herman, supra note 26, at 653-54; Yonover, supra note 78, at 92-93.
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haps insufficiently neutral. However, there is no reason to believe that
making available an alternative, elective judicial process will lead to frus-
tration and industrial strife. Employees should not be frustrated by an
alternative process that they can voluntarily choose to pursue in place of
arbitration.
Employers of course would prefer that discharged employees cov-
ered by collective agreements not have the alternative of state law causes
of action, just as they would prefer that employees not covered by such
agreements not have such causes of action. However, as long as federal
law permits states to grant minimum employment rights to all employees
within their jurisdiction,8 7 it is appropriate for the state to override these
preferences in the service of acceptable social policies. If federal law is
modified to restrict such state grants, it should restrict grants to union
and nonunion employees equally.
It also seems unlikely that employers with organized work forces
will respond to the grant of state causes of action for wrongful discharge
by resisting the negotiation of clauses providing arbitral protection for
discharge without just cause. The availability of a state law cause of ac-
tion does not add to the marginal cost of arbitral protection.88 Indeed,
this availability may even reduce such costs. Most employers would
hope that discharge disputes could be resolved through arbitration with-
out the risk of high damages from a state court action. Given the costs
and risks of state court litigation, this hope does not seem unrealistic; in
many instances employees can be expected to choose arbitration rather
than state court litigation.8 9
87. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), discussed
supra, notes 15-16 and accompanying text, and infra, notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
88. See Yonover, supra note 78, at 96 ("... a reasonable argument could be made that exposing
an employer to two procedures, rather than one, for resolution of wrongful discharge claims may
well discourage employees from entering into collective bargaining agreements and increase their
anti-union sentiment.").
89. The Court made a similar point in explaining why providing an independent federal right of
action against race discrimination in employment would not undermine the arbitral process:
Moreover, the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective bargaining agreement
remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving a wide range of dis-
putes, including claims of discriminatory employment practices. Where the collective-bar-
gaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Title VII, and where
arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfac-
tory to both employer and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to make available
the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration which may satisfy an employee's
perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving the employer the expense and
aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong
incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may often eliminate those misunderstand-
ings or discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial
forum.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974). See also Gould, supra note 83, at 10
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Furthermore, a new principle of section 301 law could be estab-
lished to clarify that employers could negotiate a clause that would con-
dition a grievant's access to an arbitration system on the grievant's
willingness to waive any state law challenge to the same employer action
being grieved. The negotiability of such conditions should surely be a
matter for federal section 301 law, rather than state law, since it concerns
control of a benefit (arbitration) provided by collective agreements. The
negotiability of such conditions would provide a further incentive for em-
ployers to accept arbitration because they would enable employers to use
arbitration as an inducement to employees to waive state causes of
action. 90
In sum, the Supreme Court was surely correct to reject the Seventh
Circuit's section 301 preemption doctrine, as well as to reverse the lower
court's decision in the Lingle case. However, the Supreme Court fared
no better in Lingle articulating its own preemption test. The test was
simply stated by the Court: "we hold that an application of state law is
preempted by section 301 ... only if such application requires the inter-
pretation of a collective bargaining agreement." 91 This test has re-
strained lower courts from preempting retaliatory discharge cases like
Lingle,92 as well as some other clearly independent state causes of actions
such as ones based on discrimination laws. 93 It has not, however, ade-
(Professor Gould believes that after Gardner-Denver parties are more interested in arbitration of
discrimination claims).
90. Given the supremacy of federal law, any state's claim that its cause of action should not be
discouraged by such clauses would have to be overridden. See also infra notes 250-51 and accompa-
nying text. The issue may be more complicated where the employee's independent cause of action is
created by some federal statute, such as Title VII. However, voluntary and knowing waivers of
mature Title VII causes of action by aggrieved employees in exchange for access to an arbitration
system seem consistent with the Alexander v. Gardner-Denver decision. Clauses in collective agree-
ments that condition access to an arbitration system on an individual's waiver of an external statu-
tory right constitute union control of the arbitral process, not union waiver of the external right, as
long as individual employees can freely choose the statutory rather than the arbitral remedy. See
also infra note 251.
91. 486 U.S. at 413. The Court did qualify this statement in footnote by explaining that the
relevance of the meaning of a collective agreement to a tangential issue in a state law action would
not warrant the preemption of the entire action. Id. at 413 n.12. As an example the Court asserted
that federal law might govern the interpretation of an agreement to determine "the damages to
which a worker prevailing in a state law suit is entitled" without the underlying state law claim being
preempted. Id. Although this example has provided some guidance for the lower courts, see, e.g.,
Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989), the general principle expressed in
the note was not sufficiently well defined to limit the preemption test set forth in the text of Lingle.
92. See, e.g., Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991); Eldridge v. Felec
Services, 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1990); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 539 (1989); Nelson v. Central Illinois Light Co., 878 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1989);
Rintone v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 865 F.2d 1220 (11 th Cir. 1989); Bednarek v.
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227, 780 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
93. See, e.g., Jackson v. Southern Calif. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 1989) (race dis-
crimination); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 539
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quately restrained lower courts from preempting many state law causes
of action that do not threaten the uniformity of section 301 law for the
facilitation of collective bargaining.94
A good illustration of the confusion not clarified by Lingle is Jack-
son v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,95 a First Circuit decision finding preempted
a unionized employee's claim that his employer's seizure and testing of a
urine sample violated both the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act 96 and the
Massachusetts right-to-privacy statute. 97 Purporting to apply the Lingle
section 301 preemption test, the First Circuit in a diversity action held
that George Jackson's claims could not be established without interpret-
ing the collective bargaining agreement that governed his employment,
and that the claim thus must be pressed only through the grievance arbi-
tration system provided by that agreement. 98 The court concluded that
since the Massachusetts laws on which Jackson relied do not create an
absolute right to be free of mandatory drug testing, the application of
these laws to Jackson's case would be influenced by the meaning of the
collective agreement. In a long and not particularly well structured opin-
ion, the court asserted that the privacy rights created by these laws could
be voluntarily waived,99 that the laws would balance employer business
interests against employee privacy interests under a standard of "reason-
(1989) (handicap discrimination); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87
(9th Cir. 1989) (age discrimination); Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co. Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th
Cir. 1988) (handicap discrimination). But see McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry Co., 844 F.2d 294
(6th Cir. 1988) (Railway Labor Act preempts handicap discrimination claim after Lingle because
collective agreement must be interpreted to determine whether employee's handicap is related to job
performance); Cuffe v. General Motors, 180 Mich. App. 394, 446 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (handicap discrimination claim preempted because it asserted discriminatory denial of senior-
ity rights defined by collective agreement).
94. See, e.g., Clark v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 937 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1991); Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of California, 936 F.2d 435 (9th Cit. 1991); Mc-
Cormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1991); Stikes v. Chevron USA Inc.,
914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015 (1991); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co.,
912 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1990); Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1989); Edelman v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1989); Douglas v. American Information Technolo-
gies Corp., 877 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1989); Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., 875 F.2d
1337 (8th Cir 1989); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989); Delapp v.
Continental Can Co., 868 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d
111 (1st Cir. 1988); Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1988); Newberry v.
Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988); Utility Workers of Amer., Local 246 v. South-
ern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988);
Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 850 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1988); Miller v. AT & T
Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988);
Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.,
830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988).
96. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, §§ IIH-11I (1986).
97. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 214, § IB (1986).
98. 863 F.2d at 114-22.
99. Id. at 118.
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ableness" that would turn on the meaning of the agreement, 100 that rea-
sonable employee expectations of privacy could also be affected by the
agreement, 01 that the agreement included a broad "management rights"
clause that could limit Jackson's rights,10 2 and that drug testing is a
"mandatory subject of bargaining" under the federal labor laws. 0 3
If the Jackson decision had held only that Jackson could not rely on
the collective agreement to enhance the privacy rights created by Massa-
chusetts law, it might have rested on the basis for section 301 preemption
established in Lucas Flour. Permitting individual employees to use col-
lective agreements to leverage their state law rights would subject negoti-
ating employers and unions to the uncertainties that uniform section 301
law avoids. Employers and unions would have to be concerned that
some clauses they were negotiating not only created the rule they envi-
sioned, but also some additional employer obligation under some state
law. The need to consider a variety of state laws, perhaps from multiple
jurisdictions, would complicate the collective bargaining process in pre-
cisely the way that Lucas Flour was intended to avoid. The Jackson
court therefore reasonably might have held that state law could not be
used to interpret the collective agreement to enhance Jackson's privacy
rights. Only section 301 federal law can be used to interpret a collective
agreement to create rights.
But the Jackson decision not only prevented Jackson from using the
collective agreement to enhance his privacy rights under Massachusetts
law. It also held that because he was covered by a collective agreement,
he could not make any claim under the Massachusetts privacy laws.
Jackson thus was denied the opportunity that a Massachusetts employee
not represented by a union would have to argue that his privacy was
invaded without reference to any collective agreement. This additional
aspect of the holding may well have been significant for Jackson. Noth-
ing the court says about the meaning of the Massachusetts laws relied
upon by Jackson means that a drug test could not violate these laws in
the absence of a collective agreement. Even if the court was correct to
conclude that Massachusetts law balances employer interests under a
reasonableness standard rather than prohibiting all drug testing, this law
surely does not protect only privacy rights defined in a collective
agreement.
The Jackson court, however, did have support in the Lingle section
100. Id. at 115-19.
101. Id. at 119.
102. Id. at 120.
103. Id.
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301 test for the complete preemption of Jackson's claims under Massa-
chusetts law. The Jackson court seems to suggest that the collective
agreement governing Jackson's employment may not only have enhanced
his state law privacy claims, but also may have detracted from those
claims by in effect compromising the privacy interests that he would have
had absent the agreement. The court seems to assume that the manage-
ment rights clause or some other provision in the agreement could have
given the employer the authority to conduct drug tests that might other-
wise be actionable under the Massachusetts laws. 1°4  The collective
agreement thus could be relevant as a defense to any claim Jackson could
make under Massachusetts law without reference to the agreement.
Since interpretation of the agreement would be necessary to assess any
such defense, the Jackson court could claim to be applying the Lingle
preemption test. 10 5
Yet note the effect of preempting state law claims of employees like
Jackson merely because employers may defend against them by asserting
that the employees' rights had been compromised or waived in a collec-
104. The court's apparent assumption that Jackson's union bargaining representative could
waive his privacy rights under Massachusetts law in a collective agreement is curious. It is doubtful
that Massachusetts would want an individual right like that to privacy to be negotiable by a collec-
tive bargaining agent, any more than Congress wanted the individual right to be free of status dis-
crimination secured by Title VII to be negotiable by a union. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). Indeed the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12,
§§ 11H-1IL (1986), under which Jackson pressed one of his claims, grants Massachusetts employees
the right to sue private entities for the denial of rights that the federal as well as state constitutions
secure against the exercise of state power. The Court has never allowed constitutional rights to be
compromised by collective bargaining agents. Such agents surely do not have control over employ-
ees' privacy rights in their physical autonomy as protected by the fourth amendment. The Court has
indeed held that third parties may only provide consent to the search of those areas that are within
their common authority. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). See also Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990). The drug testing of Jackson may not have constituted an unrea-
sonable search or seizure under the fourth amendment even if it had been conducted by the govern-
ment, but if the testing would have been unconstitutional absent a collective agreement, it surely
should have been notwithstanding the agreement.
The Ninth Circuit has also made the curious assumption that California would want any pri-
vacy rights implicated by drug testing to be waivable by a collective bargaining agent. See Schlacter-
Jones v. General Telephone of California, 936 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1991); Utility Workers of America,
Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1988); Laws v. Calmat, 852
F.2d 430, 433 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988).
105. The Ninth Circuit has made the same claim in four decisions in which it rested preemption
on the need to interpret a collective agreement to determine how collective bargaining may have
redefined the privacy rights asserted by the plaintiffs. Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of Cali-
fornia, 936 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1991); Stikes v. Chevron USA Inc., 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015 (1991); Utility Workers of Amer., Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Resolution of the issue whether Local 246 has bargained
away its members' claimed constitutional rights must rest upon ... the collective bargaining agree-
ment .... ); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1988).
This interpretation of Lingle is also embraced in Brower, Towards A Unified Accommodation of
State Law and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Federalism, Public Rights and Liberty of Contract,
26 Hous. L. REv. 389, 435-36 (1989), and White, supra note 76, at 410-14.
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tive agreement covering their employment. Even assuming that state law
does permit such waiver, the effect is to deny these employees their state
law rights on the mere possibility that they may have been waived, with-
out ever even having the opportunity to obtain a resolution of whether
they actually were waived. Jackson, for instance, probably could not
have obtained resolution of whether his state law rights were compro-
mised in the collective agreement covering his employment. Jackson
could not press a claim under Massachusetts law to arbitration, and the
collective agreement might not have required arbitral declaratory judg-
ments on its meaning. Jackson might have gone before an arbitrator to
claim the violation of any privacy rights secured by the collective agree-
ment, but the resolution of such a claim would not necessarily resolve the
question of whether his Massachusetts legal rights were compromised by
the agreement. Jackson thus is denied causes of action that would be
available to him were he not represented by a union, simply because his
union could have waived his right to bring such actions, regardless of
whether it actually did so.
This forced disparagement of the rights of unionized employees rela-
tive to those of nonunionized employees is not required to maintain a
uniform federal law whose purpose is to facilitate the negotiation of col-
lective agreements. The most that could be required by section 301 is
that federal law establish for application in state as well as federal court,
presumptions, analogous to those of the Steelworkers Trilogy, about
whether some state law right has been waived. A state court, or a federal
court with diversity jurisdiction, could apply such federal law when con-
sidering a state law cause of action like that in Jackson; the court would
need only to dismiss the action if the federal law meant that the asserted
state right had to be treated as waived. 1 6
This approach would surely be sufficient to maintain the uniformity
that the Lucas Flour Court sought in order to encourage collective bar-
gaining. This uniformity results from applying general principles, like
those established in the Steelworkers Trilogy, in state as well as federal
courts, not from requiring all contract interpretation to be conducted by
arbitrators. Recall that the rules announced in the Trilogy are for courts
106. The somewhat open-ended footnote 12 in the Lingle decision, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, see
supra note 91, may suggest that the Court anticipated this approach to treating cases like Jackson.
Thus, as a general proposition, a state law claim may depend for its resolution upon both
the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis
that does not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would govern the interpre-
tation of the agreement, but the separate state law analysis would not be thereby pre-
empted.
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to apply, not arbitrators. To require arbitrators rather than courts to
determine whether a collective agreement has compromised a state law
right is to confuse the reason that section 301 law must apply in state
courts (uniformity facilitates collective bargaining) with one central con-
sideration in the formulation of the content of that law (the encourage-
ment of arbitration). Voluntary private arbitration is the preferred
means of resolving claims under collective agreements because it
promises industrial peace. Given the relative loose use of precedent by
arbitrators 0 7 and the variant presumptions brought to bear by the arbi-
tral community,108 however, it is surely not the best way to achieve uni-
form interpretation of collective agreements. A claim based on state law
for which a collective agreement may provide a defense arguably requires
the application of uniform federal law, but it definitely does not require
arbitration to secure industrial peace.1°9
In fact, even the argument for using federal law to determine
whether a minimum guarantee granted by state law has been compro-
mised or waived in a collective agreement is not compelling. Consider
first the strength of a state's interest in applying its own law to determine
whether a right that it has created has been compromised or waived. A
state may be willing to permit the parties to collective bargaining to ne-
gotiate around a minimum employment right only if the state is assured
that they have done so with conscious attention to the right. The state
may on the one hand determine that the reasons for creation of the right
are not sufficiently strong to outweigh the clear intent of a collective rep-
resentative and employer to compromise the right, but on the other hand
also determine that these reasons are sufficiently strong to require a clear
intention to compromise. Again the analysis of the Steelworkers Trilogy
is instructive. "0 State policymakers may prefer to have doubts about the
parties' intent regarding a state-created right resolved so as to preserve
rather than limit the right; the risk of missing the intent of contracting
parties not to compromise may be more important than the risk of miss-
ing the intent of the parties to compromise. It seems that a state should
be able to express the relative valuation that it gives minimum rights in
107. See, e.g., Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 102-103 (1989).
108. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURi, How ARBrrATION WORKS 3rd Ed. (BNA 1973),
especially ch. 9.
109. Furthermore, had the Jackson court wanted to serve some general policy favoring arbitral
interpretation of collective agreements, it could have conditioned its refusal to interpret the agree-
ment on the employer's and union's willingness to obtain the interpretation of an arbitrator, rather
than leaving Jackson with the uncertain prospect of obtaining an arbitral resolution of how his
Massachusetts privacy rights were affected by the collective agreement. See supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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this way by formulating its own doctrine on when such rights can be
compromised or waived. A greater includes the lesser argument seems
applicable. If a state can completely insulate an employment right from
waiver, 1 ' it should be able to protect it from the risk of unintentional
waiver.
Furthermore, using state law doctrine to determine whether a state
law minimum employment right should be treated as waived or compro-
mised in a collective agreement does not threaten the uniform section 301
law important to the facilitation of collective bargaining. Using state law
for this purpose would not require employers to review a variety of state
laws carefully to insure that their collective agreements did not create
new and unwanted duties and exposure to liability. The only duties im-
posed by state law would be duties that would exist in the absence of any
collective agreement. State law would only have to be reviewed if an
employer wanted to use the collective agreement to escape or modify
some duty that would exist in its absence, and the employer would be
aware of any state law that it wished to so modify. No employer could
be deterred from negotiating some benefit for its employees if the negotia-
tions could only make the employer better off with respect to its state law
duties. Unions need to worry that their negotiations might result in the
qualification of the state law rights of the employees they represent; but
this concern presumably would be augmented if federal law governs
waiver, because state law can be expected to require a clearer indication
of the union's willingness to compromise rights secured by that same
state law.' ' 2
To summarize, Jackson should have been permitted to argue in a
federal court with diversity jurisdiction that, without reference to any
duties expressly or implicitly created by a collective agreement,"13 Mas-
sachusetts law affords a right of action for the kind of mandatory drug
testing to which he was subjected. Liquid Carbonic could defend either
by demonstrating that it would not have violated Massachusetts law in
11. Again, it may be that federal labor laws other than section 301 should be interpreted to
prevent states from insulating certain employment rights from waiver, see infra notes 158-89 and
accompanying text, but the Court has made clear that this is not true for all such minimum rights.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
112. One might, however, argue for a principle of section 301 law that allowed only the clear and
unequivocal waiver of any minimum rights granted by state law. The argument would rest on the
need to protect collective bargaining from the burden of unions having to worry about unintended
waiver of these rights.
113. This means, for instance, that Jackson should not be permitted to argue that his expecta-
tions of privacy were enhanced by some special conduct of his employer that was in turn en-
couraged, even if not expressly required, by the collective agreement.
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the absence of the collective agreement,' 14 or by establishing that Massa-
chusetts permits union modification or waiver of the privacy rights as-
serted by Jackson1' 5 and that the management rights clause or some
other aspects of the agreement were sufficient to constitute that modifica-
tion or waiver.
B. One Cheer For Lueck
It would have been possible for the Supreme Court to have mapped
this approach in Jackson had it articulated in Lingle a different kind of
test to distinguish the state law causes of action that should be preempted
by section 301 from those that should not. Doing so would have re-
quired a different explanation of the Court's earlier decision to preempt a
claim of bad faith implementation of an insurance contract under Wis-
consin law in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck. 116 Analysis of a case like Lueck in
which preemption was proper, in contrast to cases like Lingle and Jack-
son in which it was not, provides an appropriate section 301 preemption
test.
Roderick Lueck claimed that Allis-Chalmers had "intentionally,
contemptuously, and repeatedly failed" to make payments due him
under a disability insurance program guaranteed by the collective bar-
gaining agreement governing his employment. Lueck argued that this
constituted the tort of bad faith discharge of an insurance obligation
under Wisconsin law. 1 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
Lueck's claim was not preempted by section 301 because the "specific
violation of the labor contract, if there was one, is irrelevant to the issue
of whether the defendants [Allis-Chalmers and the insurer, Aetna Life &
Casualty Company] exercised bad faith in the manner in which they han-
dled Lueck's claim."' "18
The Supreme Court disagreed, stressing several salient points. First,
Lueck's tort claim purported to define the meaning of the insurance obli-
gation included in the collective bargaining agreement covering Lueck's
employment. "19 Second, since Wisconsin law permits parties to an insur-
ance contract to define what would constitute unreasonable or bad faith
performance of the contract, "any attempt to assess liability here inevita-
114. This also means that Liquid Carbonic could defend by showing that it would not have
violated Massachusetts law had it not taken particular action pursuant to the agreement.
115. As suggested above, see supra note 104, this seems doubtful.
116. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
117. Id. at 206.
118. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 342 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1984).
119. 471 U.S. at 213-219.
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bly will involve contract interpretation" that should be governed by sec-
tion 301.120 Third, "state-law rights and obligations that do not exist
independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived
or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agree-
ments."1 21 And fourth, Congress would have wanted Lueck's claim to
be preempted by section 301 because allowing it to proceed would "evis-
cerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law under section 301 that
it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret
the labor contract in the first instance."' 22
Seeds for many of the misconceptions discussed above concerning
the section 301 preemption doctrines that were established in Lucas
Flour are planted in this opinion. The Court relied on Lueck in framing
its section 301 preemption test in Lingle.123 Lueck has been read to re-
quire the preemption of any state cause of action that state law permits a
union to waive or alter in collective negotiations, regardless of whether
that cause of action would have existed in the absence of a collective
agreement. 124 The Lueck Court's discussion of the section 301 policy to
promote arbitration confused a federal labor policy that informs the con-
tent of section 301 law with the policy that dictates this law be applied
uniformly in state as well as federal courts.
Nevertheless, an appropriate basic test for section 301 preemption
can be extracted from the Lueck opinion. The Court's discussion there
of the promotion of arbitration is presented only as an extra reason for
preemption and does not generate the central analysis of the opinion.
Moreover, the Lueck Court, unlike the Lingle Court, never states that
any state cause of action that requires the interpretation of a collective
agreement must be preempted. The Lueck Court instead stresses the
question of whether the "state-law rights and obligations ... exist inde-
pendently of private agreements." 125 The Lueck Court also only states
that state law rights that can be waived or altered in negotiations must be
preempted if those rights do not exist "independent of any right estab-
lished by contract .... ,1126 Thus, although the Lueck opinion can be
read more broadly, it is also possible to define its test to preempt only
that state law that purports to grant some additional negotiable right to
employees because of the terms of a collective agreement covering their
120. Id. at 218.
121. Id. at 213.
122. Id. at 220.
123. 486 U.S. at 405-06.
124. See White, supra note 76, at 397; Herman, supra note 26, at 634.
125. 471 U.S. at 213.
126. Id.
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employment. The existence of such a right is dependent upon the terms
of the agreement and therefore must be governed by section 301 law.
This test of dependence on the agreement derives directly from the
policy underlying the Lucas Flour principle of uniformity. If state law
could provide employees rights that would not exist in the absence of a
collective agreement, employers would be more inhibited in the negotia-
tion of such agreements. Employers might have to consider a variety of
state laws from a variety of jurisdictions to understand the rights and
obligations that they could be creating through their negotiations. Pre-
empting state law rights that are dependent on the existence of an agree-
ment lifts this burden from collective bargaining.
This Lucas Flour-Lueck preemption rule, like the rules established
in the Steelworkers' Trilogy, is only a presumption. The Lucas Flour-
Lueck presumption is that employers and unions do not intend to create
obligations and rights defined by any state law through their negotiation
of a collective agreement. Employers and unions thus could choose to
reverse this presumption by embracing particular state law definitions of
the rights and obligations created by their agreement. Doing so would
incorporate state law as part of federal section 301 law.127 Section 301
preemption law like other section 301 law thus assists in the interpreta-
tion of the intent of the parties. 28
This section 301 preemption presumption makes sense for reasons
similar to those that justify the Steelworkers Trilogy's section 301 pre-
sumptions. First, the Congressional policy favoring private ordering sup-
ports parties to collective agreements controlling the rights and
obligations that they create by those agreements, just as much as it sup-
ports parties controlling the processes by which those rights and obliga-
tions are enforced. 129 Second, a presumption that parties to a collective
agreement do not want to embrace state law is an efficient default rule
because it expresses what would be the intent of almost all parties to
collective agreements. Employers and unions are not likely to want to
complicate the administration of agreements by creating unstated state
law rights and obligations.1 30 Third, this presumption is also efficient
127. This is in accord with the original announcement in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) of the power of federal courts to fashion federal law under section 301:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law .... But state law, if
compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as
federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights. Id. at 457.
128. Like other section 301 law, the preemption presumption must be applied by the courts,
which must determine whether the presumption has been reversed in any particular case.
129. Cf supra note 40 and accompanying text.
130. Cf supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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because it forces the party that wishes to create an extra right or impose
an extra duty as embedded in state law (generally the union) 31 to ex-
pressly inform the other party, who may not even know of the existence
of that law, of its intent to do so. This requirement avoids strategic bar-
gaining table machinations to induce the other party to expose itself to
potential liability that it does not understand.132
This section 301 preemption rule explains Lueck much more satis-
factorily than does any other analysis suggested by the Lueck opinion.
For reasons similar to those set forth in the discussion of Lingle above, 133
the holding in Lueck cannot be justified as necessary to protect arbitra-
tion and the industrial peace that it promotes. Permitting Lueck to sue
on his state law tort theory in state court would not have frustrated the
union's attempt to secure contractual rights for represented employees by
blocking Lueck's use of the arbitration system. It also would not have
discouraged negotiation of an arbitration system; on the contrary, it
probably would have given employers a further incentive to accept such a
system as a way to resolve labor disputes that could otherwise generate
more expensive litigation in state court. Even more clearly, preserving
for an arbitrator the issue of whether Allis-Chalmers had breached its
obligations under the collective agreement does not help insure the uni-
form interpretation of collective agreements. The uniform principles of
section 301 law are general presumptions, like those of the Steelworkers
Trilogy, to be applied by courts; arbitrators, by contrast, are free to apply
variant notions of contract construction without particular regard to
precedent. 134
Nor can Lueck be explained simply by highlighting the need to in-
terpret the collective agreement in order to resolve Lueck's state law
claim. In the first place, this explanation alone does not distinguish cases
like Jackson in which the collective bargaining agreement may need to be
interpreted in order to address a claim by the defendant that the collec-
tive agreement detracts from the state law rights a plaintiff employee
would have in its absence.
Second, this explanation may not even adequately rationalize Lueck
itself. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lueck had stated that an inter-
pretation of the collective agreement was not necessary because Allis-
Chalmers could have committed the Wisconsin tort of bad faith dis-
131. But not always. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990); Electrical
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); infra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
132. Cf supra note 58 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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charge of its insurance obligation without violating the collective agree-
ment. 135 This makes sense; although the insurance contract was
incorporated into the collective agreement, the tort could condemn inten-
tionally discommoding and malicious insurance administration that was
not also condemned by the contract. The tort may turn on the motiva-
tion of the insurer in processing claims, while the contractual violation
could turn on whether the insured in fact received his due payments.
The Supreme Court in Lueck attempts to answer the Wisconsin
Supreme Court by explaining that a collective bargaining agreement can
condemn much more than the violation of its express terms; collective
agreements also are read to create many implied rights and impose many
implied obligations. 136 But this answer may miss the point. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court seemed to assert that it did not care whether the col-
lective agreement imposed some implied duty of good faith on Allis-
Chalmers because Wisconsin law creates this duty as a part of public law
to supplement private insurance contracts.
In attempting to establish that interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement was necessary in Lueck, the United States Supreme
Court also makes what might have been a forced interpretation of Wis-
consin law. The Court asserts that this law permits parties to an insur-
ance contract "to bargain about what 'reasonable' performance of their
contract obligation entails," and thus what might constitute bad faith
performance.1 37 Yet even if this questionable description of Wisconsin
law is correct, the need to consider a claim by Allis-Chalmers that its
collective agreement altered Wisconsin's presumption about what is in
good faith does not alone explain why Lueck's state law claim had to be
135. 116 Wis. 2d at 569-71, 342 N.W.2d at 703-05.
136. 471 U.S. at 214-15.
137. Id. at 216-17. The Lueck Court cited no Wisconsin decision that allowed an insurer to
defend a bad faith claim by reference to some reduced standard of reasonableness or good faith set
forth in the insurance contract. It instead primarily relied on language in a 1931 Wisconsin decision
that states that "bad faith means being recreant" to a duty set forth in an insurance contract. Id. at
216, quoting Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 13, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (1931).
However, this language seems more supportive of the proposition that Wisconsin law makes its
public law tort action dependent upon there being a contract violation, the proposition that seems to
be directly rejected in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Lueck. Furthermore, other recent
Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions also seem to establish that the "tort of bad faith is not a tortious
breach of contract. It is a separate intentional wrong, which results from a breach of duty imposed
as a consequence of the relationship established by contract." Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85
Wis. 2d 675, 687, 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (1978) (emphasis supplied). See also Coleman v. American
Universal Ins., Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W. 220 (1979) (permitting third party injured employee
to sue workers' compensation insurer through bad faith tort even in the absence of a contractual
relationship). Furthermore, Anderson, the leading modern Wisconsin case, defines "bad faith" at
great length without any reference whatsoever to the terms of an insurance contract. 85 Wis. 2d at
691-93. It seems clear that the Supreme Court reached to interpret Wisconsin law in a manner that
would force it into the mold required by its section 301 preemption test.
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denied. It does not explain why Lueck could not have proceeded with
Allis-Chalmers' defense being treated under federal law if necessary. 138
An adequate explanation of Lueck must also stress that any Wiscon-
sin law on what is presumed to be bad faith administration of an insur-
ance contract would not have been applicable to Lueck's case alone
absent the collective agreement that incorporated the contract. Lueck
was attempting to use state law to provide extra meaning to his union's
contracting for disability insurance. In order to insure that such use of
state law not inhibit collective bargaining, Lucas Flour's reading of con-
gressional intent in passing section 301 requires that federal law govern
whether the contract should be read to permit this use. In order to facili-
tate efficient bargaining, it was reasonable for the Court to apply a federal
law presumption of preemption, a presumption that the parties did not
want such use of state law. The appropriate rule for section 301 preemp-
tion thus focuses on whether the state law claim is dependent on the
existence of a collective agreement, rather than on whether the state law
claim requires the interpretation of the agreement. 139
This rule can be aligned readily with the doctrine the Court has
adopted for determining whether state employment law claims artfully
assert a federal cause of action appropriate for removal from state to
federal court. It is of course black letter law that only state court actions
that could have been filed in federal court originally may be removed to
federal court by the defendant. 14 Thus, if there is no diversity of citizen-
ship, employment law actions, like other actions brought in state court,
are removable only if they present a federal question that is central to the
plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. 141 Under what it now terms the
138. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. Indeed Wisconsin could argue strongly
that its own law should be able to define how an obligation or right it creates can be altered. See
supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
139. A concern with the preservation of the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Act does not provide an adequate basis for preemption of most cases like Lueck in which state law
may provide a remedy for employer breaches of a collective bargaining agreement that stop short of
repudiation of the agreement or the collective bargaining relationship. Although such breaches are
arguably prohibited by sections 8(aX5) and 8(d) of the Act, they are certainly not its central concern.
They may, however, be of significant state interest. Furthermore, the critical issue in a section
8(a)(5) case before the Labor Board, whether the employer has modified a term or condition of
employment contained in the agreement, will not normally be the central issue in any state law
adjudication. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council, 436 U.S. 180, 197
(1978); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin thus
was correct to find Lueck's action not preempted under the NLRA preemption doctrine articulated
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566-76, 342 N.W.2d 699, 706-07 (1984).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1992).
141. See, e.g., Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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"complete pre-emption corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule," 42
the Court has read Lucas Flour to mean that a federal question is central
to any complaint that seeks to enforce a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 1 43 However, since an anticipated federal law defense does not pro-
vide a basis for original federal court jurisdiction, it also does not provide
a basis for removal. 144 Thus the Court in Caterpillar v. Williams 145 con-
firmed that an employer cannot obtain removal by claiming that a collec-
tive agreement waives or modifies a state law claim that does not itself
rest on the existence of a collective agreement.
Lower courts, however, have been confused about the meaning of
the Williams decision for the preemption by section 301 of state law
claims that are not removable to federal court. Some courts have merged
preemption with removal; they have assumed that claims that could not
be removed under the section 301 complete preemption doctrine also
should not be preempted. 146 Other courts, recognizing the distinction
between removal and preemption, have dismissed as preempted state law
claims that could not be removed because they involve collective agree-
ments only as defensive shields. 147 The Williams Court itself seems to
anticipate that state as well as federal courts would use federal section
301 law to determine whether a collective agreement provides a defense
to an independent state law claim, but it also seems to anticipate that
these claims would proceed without being dismissed for failing to exhaust
the arbitration process.1 48
142. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
143. See Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1982); Avco v. Aero
Lodge Machinists 735, 390 U.S. 557, 558 (1968).
144. See, eg., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12
(1983).
145. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
146. See, e.g., Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834 F.2d 884, 889-90 (10th Cir. 1987). See
also Schwartz & Parrot, A New Look at Federal Labor Law Preemption: Unionized Employees'
Claims in State Court, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 297, 311-12 (1988); Yonover, supra note 78, at
84-85 (1989).
Some courts, moreover, have merged the preemption and removal issues in a manner that is
directly inconsistent with the holding of Williams, by approving the removal of cases to federal court
because a defense requires the interpretation of a collective agreement. See Laws v. Calmat, 852
F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988).
147. See, e.g., Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1988). Given her
advocacy of broad section 301 preemption, Professor White not surprisingly approves of these deci-
sions. See White, supra note 76, at 408-10.
148. The Williams court states:
[T]hat when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a collective-bargaining
agreement, the state court will have to interpret that agreement to decide whether the state
claim survives. But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive
argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule.., that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to
have the cause heard in state court.
1990]
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A proper section 301 preemption analysis would avoid this confu-
sion by aligning the preemption of claims based on negotiable state law
rights and obligations with the removal of such claims. The Williams
rule for removal could be identical to that for preemption-only state
law claims that depend on the existence of a collective agreement could
be removed from a state court in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, and
only such claims could be dismissed by an application of a section 301
presumption that the parties did not want their agreement to provide a
basis for state law claims. Furthermore, for the reasons given above, 149
and contrary to the dicta of Williams, any defensive claim that an in-
dependent state law cause of action has been waived or modified in a
collective agreement should be treated under the state law that defines
the cause of action, rather than under section 301 law.
IV. NONNEGOTIABLE STATE LAW RIGHTS
The problem the Court has had reaching the straightforward section
301 preemption doctrine advocated above in part derives from its focus
on the mechanics of section 301 preemption through the interpretation of
a collective agreement. The Court would do better by focusing on the
ultimate purpose of the requirement of section 301 uniformity-the en-
couragement of free collective bargaining. The result of the Court's mis-
focus has been a rule that seems to require preemption in all cases that
must involve a significant interpretation of an agreement (including
many for which preemption is not appropriate), but that provides no gui-
dance for cases involving nonnegotiable state law claims that state law
dictates not be governed by the terms of an agreement. In this section of
the essay I will argue that the Court could have decided Lueck even
more convincingly by resting not only on a proper section 301 preemp-
tion principle, but also on broader labor law preemption doctrine derived
directly from the goal of encouraging free collective bargaining, the pol-
icy underlying section 301 uniformity. Since this latter doctrine would
not depend on the existence of a question of contract interpretation, it
could apply to nonnegotiable state minimum employment rights. I will
also explain how this doctrine might be formulated by a semi-revival of
the Teamster v. Oliver decision,150 and note how it could have simplified
482 U.S. at 398-99.
Professor White recognizes that this language stands against her position that collective bar-
gaining defenses should lead to preemption of state law claims that are themselves made independent
of the agreement, but she attempts to dismiss the language as "less than precise" "dicta." White,
supra note 76, at 409 n.140.
149. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
150. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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the Court's decision last term in the Steelworkers v. Rawson case. 151
A. An Oliver-Machinists Principle of Preemption
In Lingle the Court expressly reserved deciding whether federal law
governing collective bargaining should be read to give authority to un-
ions to waive any state law rights that the state purports to make
nonwaivable by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement.15 2 In
Lueck the Court had avoided the issue by repeatedly linking its preemp-
tion of the Wisconsin bad faith tort to its negotiability.15 3  The Court
questionably interpreted Wisconsin law' 54 to establish that the obliga-
tions imposed by the tort on which Lueck relied could be altered by the
parties to a collective agreement by bargaining about what reasonable
performance of the insurance obligation they created entails.155 Lueck
thus left open a question not resolved by Lingle: What if Wisconsin law,
as is fully plausible, had provided that the assumption of an insurance
obligation imposes certain additional duties of good faith that cannot be
waived or altered? Would the application of this law to an insurance
obligation undertaken in a collective bargaining agreement be preempted
by federal labor law?
An employer charged with bad faith in an action under such non-
negotiable state law might argue for section 301 preemption by stressing
that its obligation to insure was undertaken in a collective bargaining
agreement and is therefore not independent of that agreement. But the
151. 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990).
152. 486 U.S. at 409-10 n.9. (Citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), a
case treating the waiver of rights under the National Labor Relations Act, the Court stated that any
such waiver at a minimum would have to be "clear and unmistakable.") Id.
Consistent with its general section 301 preemption standard, the Lingle Court also stated in
another footnote that a "nonnegotiable" state law remedy that "turned on the application of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement for its application... would be preempted by section 301." 486 U.S. at
407-08 n.7. This statement may seem in some tension with the reservation in footnote 9, but in
footnote 7 the Court probably was contemplating a state law that provided an extra remedy for a
violation of a collective agreement, but that the parties could not waive. This would have been the
case, for instance, in Lueck if the Wisconsin bad faith tort on the one hand had been dependent on
finding a violation of the insurance obligation in the collective agreement, but on the other hand had
not been waivable. As argued in the next page of text, see infra note 156 and accompanying text, the
assumption of footnote 7 about the scope of section 301 preemption, like the Lingle section 301
preemption test generally, is flawed.
153. See, e.g., 471 U.S. at 212-13 (section "301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law .... state-law rights and
obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived
or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements.").
154. See supra note 137.
155. 471 U.S. at 216-18. "We pass no judgment on whether an independent, nonnegotiable,
state-imposed duty which does not create similar problems of contract interpretation would be pre-
empted under similar circumstances." Id. at 217 n. 11.
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aggrieved employee could respond by stressing that section 301 empow-
ers federal courts (and directs state courts) to use federal law only to
interpret what employers and unions contract for in collective agree-
ments; if the state law is nonnegotiable, the state does not care about
whether the parties wanted to create the additional obligation this law
imposes. Any interpretations of the agreement, and therefore any section
301 presumptions about the intent of the contracting parties, are irrele-
vant156 if the state imposes a nonnegotiable good faith obligation as a
matter of law.' 57
By widening its focus from that of section 301, however, the Lueck
Court could have avoided uncertainty about the preemption of nonnego-
tiable state rights and obligations; it could have obviated the need for the
inevitably uncertain analysis of state law by a federal court that the
Court felt compelled to give Wisconsin law; and it could have made its
decision to preempt Lueck's claim more convincing. There are two very
strong interrelated reasons to preempt actions under state laws like that
of the Wisconsin tort relied upon by Lueck, regardless of whether the
state law permits waiver or alteration in the collective agreement. Each
of these reasons derives from the strong federal labor law policy favoring
the encouragement of free collective bargaining.
The first informs the Lucas Flour uniformity principle that is the
basis for section 301 preemption. Whether or not a right or obligation is
negotiable under state law, the fact that right or obligation can be given
legal force by the negotiation of a collective agreement can inhibit collec-
tive bargaining by making its impact more uncertain. An employer ne-
gotiating a collective agreement would have to be as wary of creating
some additional nonnegotiable obligation under state law as it would of
creating a supplementary negotiable obligation. Allis-Chalmers, for in-
stance, would have to be equally concerned about state laws that impose
nonnegotiable obligations on those who undertake insurance obligations
as about state laws that impose negotiable obligations. Thus, the federal
labor policy underlying section 301 preemption is applicable to the pre-
emption of certain nonnegotiable state rights. This is true even if uni-
form principles or presumptions for contract interpretation, and thus
156. Professor Brower seems to have appreciated this. See Brower, supra note 105, at 435.
157. If the state imposes such a nonnegotiable obligation, contrary to the argument of Lueck's
counsel before the Supreme Court, see 471 U.S. at 215 n. 10, it should also be irrelevant whether the
collective bargaining agreement also provides a remedy for bad faith discharge of an insurance obli-
gation. A nonnegotiable duty may be one the state wishes to impose regardless of arrangements
made in a collective agreement.
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section 301 law itself, are not applicable because the state law does not
care about the meaning of any private bargain.
Second, laws like that relied upon by Lueck, regardless of whether
they are fashioned by the state to be nonnegotiable, inhibit free collective
bargaining in an additional way. They render more difficult the negotia-
tion of the particular contractual benefit or obligation that invokes the
supplementary right or obligation created by state law. For instance, had
the Wisconsin bad faith tort been nonnegotiable, it would have made the
grant of disability insurance potentially more expensive for Allis-Chal-
mers. The company therefore might have been more resistant to the
grant of this particular benefit in negotiations. Any nonnegotiable state
law that leverages some contractual benefit would inevitably have the
effect of rendering that benefit more expensive and therefore more diffi-
cult to achieve in negotiations. Allowing the state to use state law in this
manner thus would allow the state to influence the substantive terms of
collective agreements.
Both of these reasons for preempting certain nonnegotiable state law
rights of action could be made part of a broader labor law preemption
principle than one tied to section 301 alone. The principle could be
broadly stated as requiring the preemption of any state law granting em-
ployees represented by unions minimum rights or benefits that make it
more difficult for unions to negotiate other rights or benefits within the
scope of mandatory bargaining defined by the National Labor Relations
Act. 158 This principle could be derived from the Court's decision in
Teamsters v. Oliver' 9 which held that Ohio could not use its antitrust
laws to prevent a union from negotiating a clause, within the mandatory
scope of bargaining, that protected the wages of the employees it repre-
sents. 160 The decision thus defended union negotiation of employee ben-
158. It should, however, be acknowledged that the broader preemption principle elaborated be-
low would not support removal of state court actions to federal court under the complete preemption
doctrine of Avco v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), because claims based on nonnegotiable state
law rights do not seek simply to enforce an agreement resulting from collective bargaining. See
supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text. Nonnegotiable state rights, even if conditioned on the
provision of some benefit in a collective agreement, have a public law basis independent of the intent
of that agreement.
As the Court explained in Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), preemption doctrine
other than that which can be expressed in section 301 law must be dependent on implementation by
state, as well as federal courts subject to Supreme Court review.
159. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
160. Ohio had held its antitrust law to be violated by a collective agreement that prescribed the
"terms and conditions which regulate the minimum rental and certain other terms of lease when a
motor vehicle is leased to a carrier by an owner who drives his vehicle in the carrier's service." 358
U.S. at 284-85. "The union justified the [prescription] as necessary to prevent undermining of the
negotiated drivers' wage scale said to result from a practice of carriers of leasing a vehicle from an
owner-driver at a rental which returned to the owner-driver less than his actual costs of operation, so
19901
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efits from the inhibition of state law.
The broad preemption principle suggested above also could be
stated as an important part of the preemption doctrine the Court now
refers to as Machinists preemption, after its decision in Machinists v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Commission.'6' In Machinists, as in Team-
sters v. Morton 162 on which it relied, the Court explained that
Congressional passage of the National Labor Relations Act expresses an
intent that certain labor-management relations conduct be "unregulated
because left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces."' 163 The
Court found in Machinists and Morton that Congress intended that cer-
tain forms of union protest activity be neither protected or prohibited by
either federal or state law so that "the balance of power between labor
and management" necessary for the collective bargaining contemplated
by the Act not be upset. 164 Citing Oliver in Machinists, the Court sug-
gested that its ultimate concern was in part that state law not "influence
.. the substantive terms on which the parties contract. ' 165 "Our deci-
sions... have made it abundantly clear that state attempts to influence
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements are as inconsis-
tent with the regulatory scheme as are such attempts by the NLRB
.... 166 The Court in Lueck thus could have relied on both Oliver and
Machinists to apply a preemption principle that restricts state law from
influencing collective bargaining on those topics that Congress intended
to be negotiated under the free play of economic forces that it left
unregulated.
However, there would be two major difficulties with such broadly
formulated preemption doctrine. First, most clearly in Metropolitan Life
Insurance v. Massachusetts,167 decided in the same term as Lueck, the
Court has limited the application of the Oliver and Machinists precedent
to state laws that provide minimum employment rights or guarantees. 168
In Metropolitan Life the Court unanimously upheld a Massachusetts law
that required employers that provide their employees a health care plan
that the driver's wage received by him, although nominally the negotiated wage, was actually a wage
reduced by the excess of his operating expenses over the rental he received." Id. at 289.
161. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
162. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
163. 427 U.S. at 140.
164. 377 U.S. at 260. In Morton the Court held that Ohio law could not prohibit a form of
secondary boycott left unregulated by the National Labor Relations Act. In Machinists the Court
struck down a state law penalizing a concerted refusal to work overtime.
165. 427 U.S. at 153 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents International, 361 U.S. 477, 490
(1960)).
166. 427 U.S. at 153.
167. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
168. See also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1987).
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covering hospital and surgical expenses to also provide certain specified
minimum mental health-care benefits. The Court directly addressed an
argument that the Oliver and Machinists lines of cases required the pre-
emption of such minimum-benefits statutes as applied to employees cov-
ered by a collective agreement. 69 The Court argued that the "NLRA's
declared purpose . . . to remedy '[t]he inequality of bargaining power
between employees... and employers'.. .1170 is not at all disturbed by
minimum-benefit legislation. Indeed, "[i]t would turn the policy that
animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized
workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from bene-
fiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on nonun-
ion employers." 171 Not surprisingly, therefore, Metropolitan Life has
been understood to render Oliver without precedential authority for gen-
eral state minimum benefit laws 172 and to limit Machinists and Morton to
the preemption of state laws regulating the processes of collective bar-
gaining, rather than mandating the substantive terms of agreement. 73
Second, and more fundamentally, the Court would be correct to re-
ject as inconsistent with any plausible Congressional intent doctrine that
required the preemption of any state law that might influence the terms
of collective agreements by making the negotiation of particular terms
more difficult. Such preemption doctrine could apply to any minimum-
benefit legislation that required employers to compensate their employees
in part by providing particular fights or benefits that the state deemed
essential. This is true because any employer that must undergo the cost
of providing one particular benefit will be somewhat less able and willing
to agree in negotiations to provide any other particular benefit. For in-
169. 471 U.S. at 749-58.
170. Id. at 753 (quoting NLRA, section 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151).
171. Id. at 756. The Metropolitan Life Court in part relied on Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497 (1978), which also seemed to have limited the force of Oliver by declaring that "there is
nothing in the NLRA... which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those
issues, such as pension plans, that may be the subject of collective bargaining." Id. at 504-05. How-
ever, Malone's holding that a pre-ERISA Minnesota law establishing minimum funding and vesting
levels for employee pension plans was not preempted could easily be explained as turning on the
Court's interpretation of the intent of Congress in the Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act of
1958 to leave the regulation of pension plans to the states. Indeed such a narrow explanation of
Malone was adopted by the Court in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981),
holding a state law preempted by ERISA, and relying in part on the policy expressed in Oliver to
preclude "state interference with labor-management negotiations." Id. at 525-26 and n.23.
172. See Herman, supra note 26, at 625-39. Inasmuch as Ohio did not object to unilateral em-
ployer regulation of the rental and compensation for owner-operated trucking equipment, Oliver still
can be read to support the preemption of state laws that attempt to proscribe collective bargaining
agreements on topics that are otherwise unregulated. See Cox, Recent Developments in Federal La-
bor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 298 (1980).
173. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1987).
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stance, Illinois employers required by the law upheld in Lingle to be sub-
ject to a state remedy for retaliatory discharge will have to include the
possibility of incurring expenses under such a remedy in their expected
labor costs. Theoretically, at least, the increase in expected costs due to
this inclusion could change some employers' calculations of whether
some other benefit should be resisted in collective bargaining. Some em-
ployers thus might force unions to agree effectively to have represented
employees compensate employers for the benefit required by state law.
In reality the process of collective bargaining and the potentially relevant
economic factors are much too complicated to predict the effect of the
grant of any particular minimum benefit on a union's ability to obtain
any other particular benefits,' 74 but some effect is clearly plausible.
Such a speculative effect, however, should not warrant the preemp-
tion of all state minimum benefit law without some direct expression of
Congressional intent. As stated by the Court in Metropolitan Life, "there
is no suggestion in the legislative history of the Act that Congress in-
tended to disturb the myriad state laws then in existence that set mini-
mum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way to the processes of
bargaining or self-organization."' 75 Therefore, if the Oliver and Machin-
ists line of cases are to provide preemption doctrine that can realistically
be used to clarify the treatment of state laws like that invoked by Lueck,
whether or not these laws are negotiable, that doctrine must be narrowed
from the broad formulation given above.
One narrowing principle is readily suggested by a comparison be-
tween the state laws invoked in the Lingle and Lueck cases. Illinois did
not condition its grant of a retaliatory discharge cause of action on an
174. Potentially relevant to the question of whether any given employer would or could extract
in negotiation with a union compensation for the costs of some minimum state benefit, for instance,
would be the level of surplus extracted by the employer from its product market, the tightness of the
labor market confronting the employer, the substitutability of capital for labor in the employer's
production processes, the geographical mobility of those processes, and the level of support and
solidarity enjoyed by the union. All of these factors affect the extent to which the grant of minimum
benefits can change the distribution of a particular firm's resources between capital and labor. See
generally C. CRAYPo, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ch. 2 (1986); J. KREPS, P.
MARTIN, R. PERLMAN & G. SOMERS, CONTEMPORARY LABOR EONOMICS AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS 189 (1980).
It is even plausible that the grant of certain minimum benefits not only redistributes social
resources from capital to labor, but also actually facilitates a union's negotiation of certain additional
benefits. For instance, the grant of some judicial rights of action might make the grant of an arbitra-
tion remedy more attractive to an employer that wants to avoid use of the judicial remedy. See supra
notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Minimum wage legislation may also facilitate an increase in
real wages for union employees of employers with some level of surplus to share; strong unions may
be able to use wage minima to push up the pay scales that organize the internal labor markets of
such employers.
175. 471 U.S. at 756. See also Herman, supra note 26, at 644-47 (relying on legislative history of
Wagner Act).
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employee's obtaining some other benefit from his or her employer; the
cause of action was given to all employees eligible under state law for
workers' compensation benefits. Wisconsin, by contrast, conditioned the
availability of the tort action invoked by Lueck on the secural of some
insurance obligation. Wisconsin law thus purported to guarantee an ad-
ditional benefit "Y" for any employee granted a benefit "X" by his or her
employer. A strong argument can be made that such conditional, if X -
then Y, state benefit laws inhibit collective bargaining in a significant way
that traditional, nonconditional laws like the retaliatory discharge provi-
sion invoked by Lingle do not.
Conditional minimum benefit laws not only increase employers' gen-
eral labor costs and thus plausibly threaten to make the negotiation of
any other benefit somewhat more difficult for unions; they make the ne-
gotiation of the particular benefit on which the extra benefit is condi-
tioned especially costly. They thus not only might have a small effect on
the negotiation of other benefits in general, they also discourage the nego-
tiation of one benefit in particular. If that benefit is one, such as disabil-
ity insurance, that Congress intended to be obtainable by unions through
the processes of mandatory bargaining under the Labor Act, the argu-
ment for the preemption of the state conditional minimum benefit seems
much stronger than that for the preemption of any nonconditional bene-
fit. The latter kind of benefit does not discourage the negotiation of any
particular other benefit as long as the union retains other chips for bar-
gaining table negotiations.1 76 Furthermore, the uncertainty in collective
bargaining that can be engendered by allowing states to require employ-
ers that grant certain benefits to also grant certain additional benefits 77
is not created by allowing states to grant minimum benefits that are not
dependent on any terms in an employment contract.
This distinction accords with the Oliver decision. It places condi-
tional nonnegotiable minimum benefits laws along a continuum, one pole
of which is illustrated by the antitrust law preempted in Oliver. Condi-
tional minimum benefit laws are closer to this Oliver pole than are non-
conditional benefit laws. The Oliver Court overturned Ohio's prohibition
of a union's negotiation of a particular kind of wage protective provision
that the Supreme Court found within the Labor Act's scope of
mandatory bargaining. The Court thereby insured that a state would not
176. Theoretically a state could mandate such a comprehensive set of benefits as to leave little
room for collective bargaining of any other benefits. This theoretical possibility has surely not yet
been realized and probably never would be. If it were, the Court could distinguish Metropolitan Life
to preempt the comprehensive state law.
177. See, e.g., supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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prevent a union from using the processes of collective bargaining to ob-
tain a particular benefit. While conditional benefit laws do not prevent
the negotiation of the particular benefit on which additional benefits are
conditioned, for the reasons just explained they can discourage the nego-
tiation of such a benefit more than can a nonconditional benefit law.178
Explaining Oliver as prohibiting state discouragement of union ex-
traction of particular benefits within the scope of mandatory bargaining,
while permitting state prevention of employer extraction of waivers of
minimum employment rights granted by the state, does weave an asym-
metry into labor preemption law. This asymmetry permits states to pro-
tect employee-rights from negotiation, while preventing them from
offering the same protection to certain legal rights granted employers.
However, this asymmetry is consistent with the redistributive goals of the
Labor Act as stressed in Metropolitan Life. 17 9 Although it is problematic
whether any particular nonnegotiable minimum benefit can effect a redis-
tribution of any particular firm's resources to employees,1 80 the Court
has fairly read the Labor Act not to express any Congressional intent to
prevent the states from making the same attempt to do so for union em-
ployees as for nonunion employees. 181 Furthermore, state interests in pa-
ternalistic protection of employees seem much stronger than state
interests in paternalistic protection of relatively sophisticated employers.
However, the distinction drawn above between the preemption of
conditional minimum benefit laws and the nonpreemption of noncondi-
tional minimum benefit laws is not as consistent with the actual holding
of Metropolitan Life as it is with much of its analysis or with the holding
of Oliver. The reason is simply that Metropolitan Life upheld a condi-
tional minimum benefit law. The Massachusetts statute challenged there
required only employers that provide health-care plans covering hospital
and surgical expenses to provide specified minimum mental health-care
benefits. The defendant insurance companies argued that federal labor
law prevented Massachusetts from requiring collective bargaining agree-
178. Dissenting from the Court's upholding of a pre-ERISA Minnesota law imposing minimum
vesting and funding limits on pension plans, Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 516
(1978), Justice Powell exhibited an appreciation of how conditional benefit laws can have an inhibi-
tory effect on collective bargaining similar to that which influenced the Oliver decision. "Minnesota
... imposes a principle of direct liability that well may discourage employer participation in matters
of such vital importance to working men and women." Id.
179. 471 U.S. at 753-56.
180. See supra note 174.
181. "It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to
have penalized workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from
state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers." Metropolitan Life, 471
U.S. at 756.
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ments to grant mental health benefits whenever they provide for other
health insurance coverage. Although Metropolitan Life came to the
Court on review of a state court action by the state of Massachusetts to
compel insurers to provide the mandated benefits whenever the condi-
tions of the law were satisfied, the preemption analysis just given could
have been applied in the same manner as in an action by an individual
employee like Lueck to obtain the benefit promised by state law. The
finding of nonpreemption in Metropolitan Life meant that the provision
of health insurance will be more expensive for Massachusetts employers
and therefore will be more difficult to extract in bargaining. 18 2
The potential tension between Lueck and Metropolitan Life is not
treated in either opinion, though Justice Blackmun wrote during the
same term for a unanimous Court in each. The tension could be eased in
any of three ways, each of which would preserve a role for the Oliver-
Machinists principle advocated above in the preemption of state law.
First, Lueck can be treated as turning on the Court's questionable finding
that the bad faith tort on which Lueck relied was in fact negotiable under
Wisconsin law.18 3 This treatment of Lueck would entail acceptance of
states' discouraging the negotiation of particular benefits, like disability
or health insurance, within the mandatory scope of bargaining, by adding
to their costs the costs of other mandatory benefits. It would not neces-
sarily entail acceptance of other state laws that more directly discourage
particular benefits and thus come closer to the Oliver pole of total
prohibition. 184
Second, Metropolitan Life could be drained of precedential authority
by some future acceptance by the Court of the distinction between condi-
tional and nonconditional minimum benefits.18 5 The Court in Metropoli-
tan Life considered only the insurance companies' argument that Oliver
and Machinists require the preemption of all state laws that require any
182. The state minimum funding and vesting pension law upheld in Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978), was also a conditional law.
183. See supra note 137.
184. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
.185. Metropolitan Life could be explained as correct on the basis of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
which reserves authority for the states to enact laws "which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business," (insurance), 59 Stat. 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a). The Court in Metropolitan Life stated
that they would have found the Massachusetts mental health care benefit law not preempted because
of this Congressional reservation of power for the states, even if the court had chosen to interpret
Oliver broadly. 471 U.S. at 752 n.29.
A similar congressional intent to reserve power for the states could be found for other condi-
tional state minimum benefit laws. For instance, state anti-discrimination laws that require granting
benefits for all workers equal to those granted some favored status group, such as white males, can be
viewed as effectively conditional minimum benefit laws that Congress clearly intends to preserve
after passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
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minimum benefits for union-represented employees; it did not consider
the more limited claim that collective bargaining is excessively inhibited
only by conditional laws.186 Had it done so it might have distinguished
the minimum benefit laws that existed at the time of the passage of the
NLRA and that were apparently accepted by Congress.187
The third, and perhaps best option, would be to distinguish the kind
of conditional benefit law invoked in Metropolitan Life from the kind
considered in Lueck, preempting only the application of the latter to em-
ployees covered by collective agreements. The important difference be-
tween the laws treated in the two cases is that the Massachusetts law
required the provision of an additional independent substantive benefit
(mental health care), while the Wisconsin law provided additional reme-
dial protection (a tort-based right-of-action) for a benefit created by the
collective agreement. It is true that the Massachusetts law might be po-
tentially as costly for employers and therefore as much of a discourage-
ment of the negotiation of the triggering benefit, but a law that requires
remedial processes other than those negotiated might be viewed to in-
trude more on the collective bargaining process. The point is not that a
law like that of Wisconsin's should be disfavored because it threatens
industrial stability by discouraging use of the arbitration process; this
should not be the case as long as a bargained for arbitration process re-
mains open as an alternative to employees.188 Rather the point is that
such a law prevents collective bargaining parties from defining the rights
they create by tailoring the procedural system for protecting those rights.
Furthermore, a case can be made that a state has a stronger interest in
laws like that of Massachusetts which use the provision of one substan-
tive benefit to determine whether it is economically feasible to provide
186. Even if Metropolitan Life's protection of state minimum benefit laws from the reach of
Oliver is limited to those laws that are not conditional, this protection would still be important for a
significant class of possible preemption cases involving nonconditional state laws. See, e.g., Beckwith
v. United Parcel Service, 889 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1989) (relying on Metropolitan Life to find not
preempted state law prohibiting employers from satisfying claims through payroll deductions made a
condition of employment).
187. States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State. Child labor laws, minimum and other
wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety... are only a few examples ....
State laws requiring that employers contribute to unemployment and workmen's compen-
sation funds, laws prescribing mandatory state holidays, and those dictating payment to
employees for time spent at the polls or on jury duty all have withstood scrutiny.
471 U.S. at 756 (citations omitted).
It is true, however, that preemption of all conditional laws like that upheld in Metropolitan Life
would significantly impede the contemporary fashioning of minimum benefit laws. Massachusetts,
for instance, might have wanted to require only employers who determine that they can afford gen-
eral health insurance for their employees to also provide mental health benefits.
188. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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another substantive benefit that the state would like to guarantee, than a
state has in a law that determines how a right created by a private agree-
ment between relatively sophisticated parties like unions and employers
should be protected.189
B. Application to Rawson
Whichever of these three options is chosen, the Oliver-Machinists
preemption principle suggested here could still play an important role
supplementing section 301 preemption doctrine and thereby alleviating
pressure to manipulate state law to make it vulnerable to the Court's
inflated section 301 doctrine. This role is made even more clear by the
Court's decision last term in Steelworkers v. Rawson t90 than by the
Lueck decision. Rawson held that section 301 required the preemption of
a claim by survivors of several deceased Idaho miners against a union for
negligently inspecting a mine before an accident that caused the miners'
deaths. The Court concluded that since the union's participation in mine
inspections was made possible by provisions in their collective bargaining
agreement with the management of the mine, any duty in connection
with the inspection had to arise out of the collective agreement and be
dependent upon an analysis of its terms.191
As explained by Justice Kennedy in dissent, 92 this reasoning ig-
nored the state law on which the Supreme Court of Idaho had deter-
mined that the miners' survivors could base an unpreempted action for
negligence. That law, long and well established in Idaho, is the general
tort doctrine that imposes a duty to act with care on any party who un-
dertakes to render services to another that may be important to that
other's well being, whenever that undertaking induces reliance or the
failure to perform it with care increases the risk of harm.1 93 This law
could have been used against the union without any interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement that required the inspection that was al-
legedly negligent. Nor was application of this law dependent on the col-
lective agreement. The law could be applicable to any inspection
189. State interests need not be weighed if Congress has determined that state law must give
way. See Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984). But the probable
weight of state interests in a class of cases might be relevant to the preemption line that Congress
would want to draw.
190. 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990).
191. Id. at 1910-11.
192. Id. at 1913.
193. This paraphrases a standard from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965),
relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rawson. Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America,
I l I Idaho 630, 637, 726 P.2d 742, 749 (1986). As Justice Kennedy noted, section 323 has been
applied consistently by the Idaho courts to a variety of cases. See 110 S. Ct. at 1914.
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conducted by a union, whether or not authorized by an agreement with
the employer. The state law duty recognized by the Idaho Supreme
Court arose from union agents' participation in an inspection that could
have increased the risk of harm to plaintiffs, not from any right or obliga-
tion of the union to perform such an inspection.194
Rawson therefore was a very different case from Electrical Workers
v. Hechler, where the Court easily applied Lueck to preempt a Florida
employee's suit against her union for failing to fulfill a duty assumed
under a collective agreement to ensure her a safe work place. 95  The
Hechler claim required interpretation of the agreement to determine
whether the union in fact assumed such a duty. It also was dependent on
the agreement because Florida state law imposes no duty of care on un-
ions to ensure a safe working environment in the absence of some private
contractual commitment. 196
194. The union might have argued in Rawson that state tort law limits the duty of inspectors to
that inspection that they undertake to make and that defining the extent of the undertaking would
have had to depend on an interpretation of the collective agreement. Such an argument was success-
fully made in a similar case applying Illinois law, Sluder v. Mine Workers, 892 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.
1989). However, the theory applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rawson, and probably available
under Illinois law in Sluder as well, was that the inspection itself defined the undertaking, whether or
not that inspection was coterminous with the inspection authority granted union officials by the
collective agreement.
195. 481 U.S. 851 (1987). An earlier decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Rawson had been
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Hechler. Steelworkers v.
Rawson, 482 U.S. 901 (1987). The Idaho court adhered to its holding of nonpreemption by distin-
guishing Hechler as requiring reference to the collective bargaining agreement to determine the stan-
dard of care required of the defendant union. 115 Idaho 785, 770 P.2d 794 (1988).
196. See 481 U.S. at 859-62. The Hechler Court thus made clear that section 301 law would
have to determine whether the parties intended to give employees any right to enforce a duty im-
posed on the union to ensure a safe work place. The Hechler Court did not, however, indicate how
section 301 law might make that determination. It instead remanded the case for lower court con-
sideration of whether any possible section 301 cause of action of Hechler's might be barred by the
short six months statute of limitations the Court has placed on duty of fair representation suits. Id.
at 863-65 (noting DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In a short concurring opinion
Justice Stevens stated that the Court should have dismissed the complaint because any claim that a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union with an employer on behalf of represented
employees could create some right of action for the employees against the union is beyond under-
standing. 481 U.S. at 865. Though it did not adopt Justice Stevens' summary position, the six
Justice majority in Rawson (including Justice Stevens) did suggest that section 301 law should utilize
a presumption against claims by employees against their unions based on collective agreements, a
presumption that could be overridden only by "language in the collective-bargaining agreement spe-
cifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable against the union by the individual
employees." 110 S. Ct. at 1912. The Court elaborated that such intent cannot be found in provi-
sions that permit or even require the union to inspect or otherwise provide for industrial safety, for
such provisions are limitations on the general authority of employers to control the workplace, not
promises of the union to the employer, let alone to employees. In my view a very heavy presumption
is appropriate in these cases. The intent to create potential union liability to employees through
collective agreements is neither likely nor desirable under federal labor law. Cf. supra notes 45-63
and accompanying text. Collective bargaining should not be used as a mechanism for employers to
represent employees against a union. Such use of the process by an employer seems inconsistent
with its duty to treat certified unions as exclusive bargaining agents.
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Nevertheless preemption was certainly appropriate in Rawson. It
was appropriate not because of the need for uniform federal law to inter-
pret collective agreements, but rather because allowing claims like those
of the Rawson plaintiffs would significantly discourage union negotiation
of an employee benefit unions have increasingly been seeking-participa-
tion by employee representatives in the protection of the safety of the
work environment. If unions are vulnerable to substantial judgments for
not being as effective as they might have been in improving workplace
safety, it will not be long before they cease attempting to negotiate this
participation. The Rawson claim, much more clearly than the condi-
tional laws treated in Lueck and Metropolitan Life, would inhibit what
the NLRA was intended to encourage-the free negotiation of benefits
within the scope of mandatory bargaining. Thus, even if neither of the
two types of conditional laws should be preempted under the Oliver-Ma-
chinists principle explained above, the Rawson plaintiffs' claim should
be.1 97 The fact that these plaintiffs did not necessarily seek more than an
application of general Idaho tort doctrine, which would apply regardless
of the union's or any other party's reason for undertaking to inspect,
should not affect this conclusion for cases in which the union's inspection
was a collectively bargained attempt to benefit employees. Even the ap-
plication of general state laws should not be permitted in cases where
that application comes as close to the total discouragement of an em-
ployee protective provision as does the law Idaho sought to apply in
Rawson. 198
The Rawson Court was thus correct to stress the importance of the
197. Oliver-Machinists preemption would also be needed in cases where an injured employee
asserts that state law requires unions to accept exposure to tort damages for breaching a contractual
duty to insure a safe workplace. For instance, Oliver-Machinists preemption might have been helpful
in the Hechler case. The Florida law invoked by Sally Hechler might have conditioned the imposi-
tion of a nonnegotiable tort-based public duty on a union's assumption of a contractual duty in a
collective agreement. Section 301 would not alone be adequate to preempt such a law because Flor-
ida could claim that it did not care about any intent of the parties to such an agreement to exempt
the union from tort liability. The Florida law would be a nonnegotiable conditional minimum bene-
fit law that should be preempted because of the particular way that it would discourage collective
negotiation of the employee benefit of union authority to help secure a safe workplace. See also
Sluder v. Mine Workers, 892 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1989) (state tort law dependent on contractual duty
to inspect, but probably not negotiable).
Of course in order to establish tort liability against a union for negligent participation in an
inspection, an injured plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the negligence caused the accident
and this might require determining whether the union had authority to correct the risk it should
have spotted. This does not, however, mean that the state tort law cares whether the parties wanted
to permit a tort action.
198. In my view whether a state law is specifically directed toward labor-management relations,
or is rather of general application, is most relevant for consideration of Machinists preemption of
state laws that may affect the balance of negotiating power between unions and employers. See Cox,
supra note 171; Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56 (1972).
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plaintiffs' attempt to impose a greater duty on the union because of a role
the union was able to assume through its success in collective bargain-
ing.' 99 However, contrary to another suggestion of the Court, 2°° there
should also be preemption of a claim alleging that a union inspector with
authority secured from the employer had breached the general duty of
care owed by all in our society to all others, by, for example, making a
mine more dangerous by negligently moving a safety device. As long as
the allegedly negligent act was committed while the union agent was us-
ing authority obtained from the employer to benefit represented employ-
ees,2I it should be protected from state law in order to insure that
negotiations to gain such authority not be chilled.202
199. 110 S. Ct. at 1913. The Rawson Court therefore did not have to address an issue also
avoided expressly by the Court in Hechler. whether state law can impose a duty to secure a safe
workplace on unions by virtue of their representational capacity rather than because of anything
contained in a collective agreement. See Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 862-63 n.5
(1987). In my view, perhaps under a different elaboration of the Machinists precedent, the Court
should clearly find preempted any such attempt by state law to augment the duty of fair representa-
tion imposed on unions by federal law. By burdening unions with extra responsibility, such an
augmentation would affect "the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our
national labor policy." Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964). State laws should not
impose such extra responsibility except when authorized by federal law, such as Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
One commentator has argued that unions should be liable under the federal duty of fair repre-
sentation law for failing to secure minimal workplace safety for represented employees. See Schmall,
Workplace Safety and the Union's Duty After Lueck and Hechler, 38 KANs. L. REv. 561 (1990).
Such a duty, however, would impose yet another burden on today's beleaguered unions, without
offering any assistance to the vast majority of American employees who are not represented by
unions. Union leaders who wish to use contractual safety guarantees to promote organization are
now free to do so, without governmental mandates that would restrict their judgments on how their
limited resources could best benefit their membership. See generally Harper and Lupu, Fair Repre-
sentation As Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1211 (1985).
200. 110 S. Ct. at 1913.
201. This doctrine of course would not preclude recovery by an injured employee from a work-
ers' compensation system.
202. This doctrine is applicable outside the workplace safety context. For instance, application
of the doctrine would have corrected the mistake made by the Fifth Circuit in not preempting a
negligence claim against a union for failing to warn a shipowner of the violent propensity of a worker
it referred to a maritime vessel pursuant to its negotiated authority to affect hiring. Miles v. Melrose,
882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989).
A case might be made, however, that general state tort law against bad faith or malicious inflic-
tion of harm ought to be able to be applied to union actions taken pursuant to responsibilities se-
cured through collective bargaining to benefit employees. Such law might not chill the negotiation
of union authority because union leaders might be less concerned about the likelihood of it generat-
ing successful suits. Cf. Farmer v. United Bd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (finding no pre-
emption of intentional infliction of emotional distress action against union for especially abusive
operation of union hiring hall authority secured in collective agreements).
The Court in Farmer considered whether the tort action before it should be preserved for the
primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board because it might concern union activity arguably protected
or prohibited by the Act. The Court suggested that even intentional state tort law should be pre-
empted if it threatened to penalize union activity that might be protected by the Labor Act. Id. at
300 and n.9. See also Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) (preemption of
intentional state tort that might penalize Labor Act-protected operation of union hiring hall). No
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V. SOME FURTHER APPLICATIONS
Although the analysis supporting the principles advocated above for
considering preemption of the application of minimum state benefit laws
to unionized employees may seem complicated, the principles can be sim-
ply summarized. First, section 301 law should establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption that parties to collective bargaining do not wish to incorporate
state law rights and obligations into their agreements. This presumption
means that any negotiable right or obligation that state law would create
because of something agreed upon in a collective agreement should not
be recognized in either federal or state court in the absence of clear evi-
dence that the particular parties to the agreement wanted recognition of
the particular right or obligation. Section 301 preemption thus reaches
only state law claims that are both dependent upon a collective agree-
ment and are negotiable.
Second, in order to facilitate the collective bargaining encouraged by
the federal labor laws, the Oliver and Machinists precedents should be
interpreted to require the preemption of state laws that render nonnegoti-
able, rights and obligations that could excessively discourage the negotia-
tion of other rights or obligations within the scope of mandatory
bargaining. In my discussion of how the Lueck and Metropolitan Life
decisions might be reconciled, I left open how much discouragement
should be considered excessive, but I at least suggested that state laws,
like that treated in Lueck, that offer additional remedial protection to
rights created by collective agreements should be preempted. 20 3
These principles can be applied without great difficulty even to those
state laws that have most challenged the courts in this era of expanding
state protection of employees. In the next section of this essay, I wish to
further demonstrate the worth of the principles by additional considera-
tion of a series of important issues raised in preemption cases not fully
discussed above.
On the one hand, adoption of the approach advocated above would
effort by a union official to make an employee workplace less safe could be even arguably protected
by the Labor Act, however.
Nevertheless, the Court's decision last term in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 6,
493 U.S. 67 (1989), to subject discriminatory hiring hall referrals to duty of fair representation
claims highlights the possibility that the Board's asserted jurisdiction over such claims could pre-
empt state law intentional tort actions because of the "arguably prohibited" strain of the Court's
Garmon preemption doctrine. Any intentional effort by a union official to harm some represented
employees by diluting their employment benefits could arguably be an unfair labor practice under a
broad interpretation of sections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act. However, the Court has refused
to preempt federal duty of fair representation court actions merely because the Board has asserted
concurrent jurisdiction. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180-83 (1967).
203. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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clarify that state law claims should not be preempted merely because
their resolution may at some point require the interpretation of a collec-
tive agreement. This is true for cases like Jackson2o where a defendant
argues that the collective agreement must be interpreted to determine
whether a union has effectively waived the state law right or obligation
on which a plaintiff relies. It is also even more clearly true for cases in
which a defendant argues that a collective agreement defines a legitimate
motive for a personnel decision challenged as tainted by some considera-
tion illegitimate under state law. For instance, a defendant may contend
that a collective agreement's authorization of discharge for a particular
rule infraction innocently explains the termination of an employee who
has invoked a state wrongful discharge law that condemns retaliation for
filing a workers' compensation claim. Preemption is not warranted in
such a case because the state law right is not in any way dependent upon
the existence of the rule relied upon by the defendant employer. Indeed,
regardless of the meaning of the rule and whether it would have war-
ranted the employee's discharge, state law could condemn the discharge
as being in fact motivated by the filing of the workers' compensation
claim. 205
Perhaps less obviously, preemption also is not warranted when the
defendant claims that the collective agreement defines a benefit, such as
seniority, that the plaintiff claims has been denied him for discriminatory
reasons proscribed by state law. In such a case, interpretation of the
meaning of the collective agreement may be central to plaintiff's claim of
discrimination. 20 6 Preemption is nonetheless not appropriate if the state
law's condemnation of discrimination is wholly independent of the agree-
204. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
205. Not surprisingly, therefore, courts in the post-Lingle era have rejected arguments for pre-
emption in this kind of case. See, e.g., Marshall v. TRW Inc., 900 F.2d 1517 (10th cir. 1990); Nelson
v. Central Illinois Light Co., 878 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1989); Bettis v. Oscar Mayer Food Corp., 878
F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1989). Professor White, however, claims that had the employer in Lingle asserted
that it discharged Lingle for violating a clause in the collective agreement, her claim would have
been preempted. White, supra note 76, at 113. For reasons given in the text, I am certain that this is
incorrect even under the Lingle test. If it were correct, however, the implications of Lingle would be
even more troublesome. Any retaliatory discharge claim from a union employee could be eliminated
by the assertion that the employee had violated a valid work rule, without giving the employee a
chance to challenge that assertion.
206. Also not surprisingly, therefore, post-Lingle courts have had difficulty with this kind of
case. See, e.g., McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, 304 (6th Cir. 1988) (preemp-
tion because collective bargaining agreement must be interpreted to determine whether plaintiff's
handicap is unrelated to job plaintiff claims); Cuffe v. General Motors Corp., 180 Mich. App. 394,
446 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (preemption because plaintiffclaims discriminatory denial of
seniority due to his handicap). But see Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir 1989)
(no preemption although collective agreement defines right to reinstatement after disability leave
that plaintiff claims was denied because of his handicap).
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ment. The state court can interpret the agreement for purposes of judg-
ing discriminatory motivation 20 7 without worrying employers that their
collective agreements could expand their legal obligations. 208
On the other hand, there is a clear range of state law claims that
should be preempted under the doctrine that I have attempted to tease
out of the Lueck decision. Any claim under state law that attempts to
supplement the protection given some right or obligation established by a
collective agreement should be subject to a presumption of preemption
under section 301 if negotiable, or preempted under the Oliver-Machinists
precedent if not. For instance, last year the Sixth Circuit correctly pre-
empted a claim of bad faith processing of a reinstatement request pursu-
ant to a right to reinstatement secured in a collective agreement. 209
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit appropriately found preempted state law
claims for wrongful withholding of wages and for wrongful death caused
by a discharge that the plaintiff could question only under the terms of a
collective agreement. 210
However, in a rare case incorrectly declining to preempt, the Sev-
enth Circuit permitted a state law retaliatory discharge claim based on
allegations that plaintiffs had not been recalled from lay off in retaliation
for their filing suits based on their collective agreement. 21' Under my
207. In doing so the state court could use any relevant section 301 law, though it is worth noting
that the source of law for the state courts is effectively not an issue because federal law has never
been developed for the interpretation of specific benefit clauses.
208. It might be argued that state discrimination laws are within the class of nonnegotiable
conditional laws that might be subject to preemption under a broad interpretation of the Oliver-
Machinists precedent; such laws do require that a benefit given to individuals outside a protected
status group also be given to those within the status group and thus may make more expensive the
provision of that benefit. However as noted above, supra note 185, the employment status discrimi-
nation laws passed by Congress clearly anticipate supplementary state regulation.
209. Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
2204 (1990).
210. Shane v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff also
had claimed that his discharge violated the National Labor Relations Act and the public policy of
the state of Washington. But the Court found the first claim to be within the primary jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, id. at 1060-61, and the second claim to be inadequately
pleaded, id. at 1062.
See also Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir. 1989); Gendron v. Chicago &
Northwestern Transp., 190 Ill. App. 3d 301, 546 N.E.2d 721 (InI. App. Ct. 1989) (both finding
preempted state fraudulent conveyance law claims to protect benefits secured by collective
agreement).
211. Pantoja v. Texas Gas and Transmission Corp., 890 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1989). This case
might also have been preempted because it falls within the primary jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. See, e.g., Altex Ready Mixed Concrete Corp. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 295, 297
(5th Cir. 1976) ("filing by employees of a labor related civil action is protected activity under section
7 of the NLRA unless the employees acted in bad faith"). The employees filed their first law suit
together. In any event under its Interboro doctrine, the Board may find an employee's assertion of
rights secured by a collective agreement to be concerted and protected from discrimination. See
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). The plaintiffs thus might have had a
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interpretation of Lueck, the Seventh Circuit conclusion that interpreta-
tion of the agreement was not necessary to resolve plaintiffs' claim should
not have been determinative. The state tort law invoked in this case, like
the laws invoked in the other two cases, purported to offer expanded
protection to rights established by collective bargaining; application of
these laws would thereby render negotiable rights more expensive and
more difficult to obtain. Such expanded protection should be afforded
only if it is part of the bargain struck in negotiation of the collective
agreement.
The doctrine drawn here from the Lueck decision also should re-
solve preemption issues in the broad range of wrongful discharge claims.
that have proliferated in state courts in the past decade and a half. On
the one hand, there should be preemption of any wrongful discharge
claim that seeks a remedy provided by state law for the violation of some
duty of fair treatment imposed by a collective agreement. For instance, a
grievant should not be able to seek state remedies for his employer's
breach of a covenant of good faith that the grievant claims is implied by a
collective agreement. 212 Nor should a grievant be able to maintain that
state law draws from employer actions required to be taken by a collec-
tive agreement some additional enforceable contractual commitment
against discharge. For instance, an employee should not be able to lever-
age duties assumed in a collective agreement by using an implied cove-
nant-of-good-faith theory against an employer for its failure to provide
the same processes given other employees in grievance arbitration.
On the other hand, there should be no preemption of any action that
can proceed without reference either to rights secured by a collective
agreement or obligations imposed by such an agreement. Several types
of wrongful discharge actions therefore should not be preempted. This is
most clearly true for what have been classified as "public policy" wrong-
ful discharge actions, including but not limited to anti-retaliation claims
like that made in Lingle. Such actions are to serve the integrity of state
law or some other general state interest, such as public participation in
juries or in law enforcement. Since state law does not condition the
availability of such actions on the existence of any contractual relation-
ship between employee claimants and their employer, permitting them to
proceed cannot possibly inhibit the negotiation of collective agreements.
However, even some state law wrongful discharge actions designed
remedy through the Board, as well as through a complaint under the collective agreement and a
potential duty of fair representation case.
212. See, e.g., Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988); Paige v. Henry
J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (decisions preempting such claims).
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to protect contractual relationships between employers and their employ-
ees may not be dependent upon rights or obligations established in collec-
tive agreements. For instance, either through judicial transformation of
the employment-at-will presumption or through legislation, a state might
impose a legal obligation on employers, whether or not unionized, not to
discharge without good cause employees who have worked for some min-
imum time period. A state might do so by presuming that employers
make a commitment of fair treatment at termination to their nonproba-
tionary or at least long-term employees. 213 Claims by employees covered
by collective agreements that such a general legal obligation has been
breached should not be preempted. No more than public policy actions
would they inhibit bargaining of some job security protection in collec-
tive agreements. Indeed, permitting such claims might even encourage
the negotiation of such protection because they provide an extra incen-
tive for employers to find a lower-cost alternative for the resolution of
termination grievances.214
For the reasons given above in the discussion of the Jackson case, it
should not make a difference if the state law makes the employer's pre-
sumed obligation reversible by a collective agreement. The fact that the
state court will have to consider the collective agreement to determine
whether the state law standards on waiver have been met does not
threaten the collective bargaining process protected by federal law.21 5
Preemption should instead turn only on whether the grievant's case de-
pends on the invocation of some employer commitment embodied in the
collective agreement or upon a course of conduct taken by the employer
pursuant to obligations assumed in the agreement.
A somewhat more complicated analysis is required for state law ac-
tions by unionized employees based on claims that employers have made
213. Montana has effectively codified such a presumption. See Montana Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act of 1987, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914. The California common
law also seemed to be approaching this position, see Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 11l Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), but the California Supreme Court's decision in Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988), to tie the covenant of good
faith action to contract seems to step back from any presumption that is independent of some kind of
actual promise, however implicit.
214. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
215. A state law that provides some independent job security guarantee of course might also
reasonably presume that any collective bargaining agreement is intended to waive the guarantee.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's leading decision in Young v. Anthony Fish Grottos, 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.
1987), sensibly interpreted California's covenant of good faith and fair dealing as not to extending to
probationary employees under a collective agreement. However, the court should have rested on
this interpretation of California law, rather than on finding that law preempted by federal law.
Young has spawned a line of cases inviting the same criticism. See, eg., Jackson v. Southern Califor-
nia Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1989); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d
1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1989).
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special, additional contractual commitments of job security separate
from any collective agreement. Caterpillar v. Williams 21 6 involved such
a claim. The plaintiffs in that case relied upon promises allegedly made
to them by their employer when they were not members of the bargain-
ing unit covered by the collective agreement. 217 However, the Williams
Court made clear that its holding that the claims were not "completely"
preempted and thus not removable to federal court would be the same
even if the "individual employment contracts were negotiated ... while
the [employees] were covered by a collective agreement .... ,,218 The
Court acknowledged the employer's arguments that the individual con-
tractual actions were preempted by the NLRA because of the exclusive
representational status of the union and that the collective bargaining
agreement should be read to waive rights under any individual contracts
covering bargaining unit employees; but it concluded that these argu-
ments did not warrant removal and should be first addressed by the state
court.
2 19
The arguments left for state court consideration were not frivolous.
Consider first the argument that a collective bargaining agreement
should be read to waive any rights established by individual contracts.
Collective bargaining agents clearly have more authority to compromise
or waive rights established in private employment contracts than allowed
them under Metropolitan Life to compromise or waive employee rights
established by state public law. In J.L Case v. NLRB, the Court ex-
plained that if the majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit "collectivizes the employment bargain, individual [contractual] ad-
vantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the
216. 482 U.S. 386 (1987). See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 388-89. See also Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 879 (1990) (holding no section 301 preemption of state action premised on pre-employment
agreement advantageous to employee). Cf Kidd v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 891 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding extra-unit employee's claim not preempted simply because her individual contract
was modeled after collective agreement).
218. 482 U.S. at 398, n.12 (emphasis in original). But see Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of
Missouri, Inc., 875 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1989) (enforcement of individual side contract for tuition
payment preempted in part because collective agreement must be interpreted to determine whether
the side contract is more favorable to employee); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d
1283 (9th Cir. 1989) (preemption because employee was covered by collective agreement that pro-
hibited individual contracts); DeLapp v. Continental Can Co. Inc., 868 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1989)
(preemption because employee was covered by collective agreement and relied on promise from
employer not to enforce a term of agreement); Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116 (11 th Cir.
1987) (Williams distinguished because employees were members of bargaining unit when independ-
ent implied oral contracts were made); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th
Cir. 1987) (Williams distinguished on same grounds).
219. 482 U.S. at 397-99 and n.13.
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collective result."' 220 This suggests that exclusive bargaining agents have
authority to trade for the collective good any contractual advantages that
have been secured by individual members of the bargaining unit. Fur-
thermore, if this authority exists, any determination of whether it has
been used arguably should be governed by the federal law that creates it,
rather than the state law that secures the individual contractual rights.
Section 301 law, in other words, should determine whether individual
contract actions can proceed in the face of a collective agreement.
This argument does not, however, adequately support a section 301
presumption of preemption of all state law actions based on individual
contracts brought by employees covered by a collective agreement. In
the first place, unions seem not to have the authority to waive all state
law claims that represented employees might base on independent con-
tracts. As the Williams Court stressed, even the J.L Case decision re-
served whether individual contracts might add to the collective bargain
under some circumstances. 221 Moreover, unqualified union authority to
waive independent contractual rights would be inconsistent with the
Court's 1983 decision in Belknap v. Hale.222 The Belknap Court held
that strike replacements could sue an employer for damages deriving
from its breach of a commitment to protect their jobs from the claims of
returning strikers, even though fulfillment of the commitment would
have been inconsistent with a strike settlement agreement subsequently
negotiated with an exclusive bargaining representative. The Court did
not decide whether the replacements could obtain specific performance
of the employer's independent commitment, but it did conclude that a
damage action was not preempted.223
Second, there is no good reason to establish a presumption under
section 301 law that collective bargaining agreements are intended to
waive any independent contractual rights that are within the authority of
unions to waive. Such a presumption does not make sense as a default
rule. It does not express the probable intent of a union that has not ex-
pressly waived independent contractual rights. 224 Unions often would
want to retain advantages groups of employees have secured on their
own; such advantages could act as chips for future negotiations. More-
over, there is no reason to penalize employees for their representative's
220. 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
221. 482 U.S. at 396 (quoting 321 U.S. at 339).
222. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
223. Id. at 506-07. The Belknap Court even found some (questionable) support for its conclu-
sion in some qualifications in the J.. Case opinion. Id.
224. Cf. supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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failure to make a contract explicit on this waiver issue; employers, not
unions, have more information on side contracts that might affect the
total industrial relations systems that they are negotiating. 225 Finally, no
general goal of labor law, such as industrial peace, would be served by
applying a presumption of waiver here.226
Consider next the argument raised in Williams that the NLRA
should preempt the enforcement of at least any independent contractual
commitment given by an employer in breach of its duty to deal only with
an exclusive bargaining representative concerning the terms and condi-
tions of employment of represented employees. Making promises to rep-
resented employees without the consent of their exclusive bargaining
representative does227 and should constitute an unfair labor practice.228
Unions therefore should be able to seek whatever remedies from the La-
bor Board that are necessary and appropriate to prevent such undermin-
ing of their status, including the prospective voiding of commitments
already made.229
However, allowing states to enforce such commitments before the
Board has held them invalid neither deprives the Board of jurisdiction to
consider later unfair labor practice charges, nor encourages further cir-
cumvention of bargaining agents. The issues in an unfair labor practice
adjudication would be totally different than those in a contract enforce-
ment case. 230 Moreover, permitting employers to evade commitments
225. Cf supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
226. Cf. supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. It is true that independent contracts that
afford certain individuals advantages could engender resentments in the bargaining unit. So might
the implied revocation of such contracts, however. Unions negotiating collective agreements should
have unrestricted authority to balance such possibilities, and such balancing would not be facilitated
by a presumption that encouraged employers to not disclose full information about what separate
agreements exist.
227. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944).
228. As explained in J... Case, even promises of advantages to individuals "are a fruitful way of
interfering with organization and choice of representatives; increased compensation, if individually
deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking down some other standard thought to be for the
welfare of the group, and creates the suspicion of being paid at the long-range expense of the group
as a whole." 321 U.S. at 338-39.
229. It is important to note that the Board's remedy for an illegal unilateral grant of enhanced
benefits to represented employees does not include an automatic cancelation of the benefits. Instead
the Board cancels the benefits only if requested to do so by the union whose authority has been
undermined. See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 28 (1982); Kendall College, 228
N.L.R.B. 126 (1977).
The Board has not made retroactive any abrogation of an individual commitment made in
violation of the Labor Act. An innocent employee thus can obtain enhanced benefits, such as higher
wages, for that period during which the commitment was in effect. Moreover, in Belknap v. Hale,
463 U.S. at 510-12, the Court suggested that the Board should not "immunize" an employer "from
responding in damages" for breach of a contract made as "part and parcel" of an unfair labor
practice.
230. Cf Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. at 510-11; Windfield v. Groen Division, Dover Corp., 890
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with individual employees by invoking preemption doctrine might even
encourage circumvention of bargaining agents. It might inspire employ-
ers who hope to reap the benefits of giving special deals to favored em-
ployees, including dividing them from their bargaining unit or union
representative, without being forced ultimately to pay the costs if a
change of circumstances causes the special deal to no longer seem attrac-
tive. Employees who have been given special promises by their employer
will not necessarily look more favorably on their exclusive representative
if that representative's status has the legal effect of denying them benefits
on which they relied. Only unions protected by section 8(a)(5) of the
Labor Act should be able to use its force to secure their status; employers
who may be guilty of the section's violation should not be able to use it as
a shield against individual employees asserting contractual
commitments. 23
1
In sum, state law claims based on contractual commitments that
have been made independent of obligations imposed by a collective agree-
ment should not be subject to any presumptions of preemption,232 re-
gardless of whether those commitments were made pursuant to an illegal
circumvention of an exclusive representative. Actions seeking remedies
that are inconsistent with a Board remedial order or with the terms of a
collective agreement should be precluded; but any additional compro-
mise of state law contractual rights should at least turn on the finding of
union intent to trade these rights for the collective good of the unit.233
F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1989) (no preemption of employee action to enforce promise of job security argua-
bly an unfair labor practice because made during certification election to influence employee votes).
231. Forcing employers to incur the costs of inconsistent legal obligations of their own making is
consistent not only with Belknap, and the Board's practice of refusing to void increased benefits
promised as part of unfair labor practices unless requested to do so by the union, see supra note 229,
but also with W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (enforcing arbitration
award of back pay for layoffs inconsistent with collective agreement but consistent with Title VII
conciliation agreement then in effect).
232. Of course, as the Court stressed in Lueck, 471 U.S. at 214-15, collective bargaining agree-
ments may impose duties beyond those expressly recited. Moreover, these duties may include a
consistent application of work place rules developed as the "industrial common law" praised in the
Trilogy, see Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-82. The Sixth Circuit in Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 884 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1989), thus correctly found a state law contractual action pre-
empted if that action relied on the common practices of a workplace governed by a collective agree-
ment. However, the Ulrich court was incorrect if the action could rely only upon an independent
promise of the employer that the complainants could return to bargaining unit work.
233. Even a state law action based on implied commitments made in an employee handbook or
personnel manual should not be preempted unless the manual is based on commitments made in
collective bargaining to the union. But see Dirks v. Sioux Valley Empire Electric Ass'n, 450 N.W.2d
426 (S.D. 1990) (preemption necessary under Lingle because manual defers to other contracts, in-
cluding collective agreement). However, state law holding employers to implied promises in em-
ployee manuals-like state law on implied in law good faith covenants, cf. supra note 215-might
reasonably be interpreted not to extend to employees covered by a collective agreement. See Shivers
v. Saginaw Transit System, 719 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (so interpreting Michigan law).
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For similar reasons state law fraud or misrepresentation claims gen-
erally should not be preempted even if they allege the misrepresentation
of terms or conditions of employment that were the subject of mandatory
bargaining under the Labor Act. A plaintiff may well be able to prove a
false representation of a decision already made to deny him promised
benefits without analysis of whether those benefits were due him under a
collective agreement. 234 But even the need to interpret a collective agree-
ment to prove an intentional fraudulent inducement to work should not
require preemption. 235 Fraud claimants seek damages for their employ-
ers' misrepresentation of what an agreement contains, not for their fail-
ure to fulfill an obligation created by the agreement. The negotiation of
obligations under collective agreements cannot be inhibited by such
claims. This is true whether or not a claimant is covered by the collective
agreement at the time of the alleged misrepresentation. 236
Misrepresentation claims, like other state law tort claims, should
only be preempted when they threaten to augment the costs of obliga-
tions assumed through collective bargaining. This would be the case if
the alleged misrepresentations were contained in the agreement itself or
in some course of conduct required by the agreement. For instance, if an
employer agreed with a union to explain to represented employees some
benefits available to those employees, the employer's explanations should
be protected from attack under state misrepresentation law. Rendering
them vulnerable to attack would increase the potential cost of the obliga-
tion to explain and thus might inhibit negotiation of that obligation. Ap-
plication of a state misrepresentation tort in this case would be equivalent
to application of the bad faith insurance-administration tort in Lueck. It
therefore should be preempted under the Oliver-Machinists precedent
even if an employer's duty not to make fraudulent misrepresentations is
not negotiable under state law. However, if an employer unilaterally
234. See Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1959 (1990); Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 27 (3rd Ci. 1989); Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers,
Inc., 804 F.2d 638, 640 (11th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953, 955-59 (8th
Cir. 1986).
235. But see Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 1987).
236. See Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1959 (1990). But
see Darden v. United States Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (11th Cir. 1987) (preempting a
misrepresentation claim based on this distinction).
It may be that a misrepresentation to an employee covered by a collective agreement could be
part of an employer's circumvention of an exclusive bargaining agent in violation of the Labor Act.
Yet Belknap also involved a misrepresentation claim by the strike replacements, and the Court found
the claim not to threaten the primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board because its adjudication would
not address issues central to any unfair labor practice charge. 463 U.S. at 510-11. It was thus
unnecessary for the Wells court to argue that the employer defendant committed no unfair labor
practice. 881 F.2d at 169-71.
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elects to explain collectively bargained benefits, there is no need to pro-
tect any misrepresentations in the explanation from the force of state law.
The line drawn in the last paragraph is similar to that appropriately
drawn by the Ninth Circuit in consideration of the preemption of em-
ployee defamation claims against employers. This court has held that
preemption is appropriate if and only if the statements that are allegedly
defamatory are required to be made by a collective agreement. 237 This is
correct not because the defamation claim requires the interpretation of
the collective agreement and therefore an application of section 301 law;
but rather because the risk of a defamation claim could interfere with
collective bargaining by deterring an employer from agreeing to union
proposals to grant to employees generally beneficial processes, such as
prompt notice of charges against them.238 Employer acceptance even of
a grievance arbitration system could be discouraged if fulfillment of the
requirements of that system could result in a defamation suit.239 How-
ever, if an employer unilaterally elects to make accusations or negative
statements about an employee that are not required by an agreement
with a collective bargaining agent, federal labor law has no concern with
defamation claims against those statements.
Finally, the preemption principles advocated in this essay can ex-
plain how courts should treat the frequent claims that intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress actions brought by unionized employees should
be preempted. If plaintiffs allege that an employer has intentionally
harmed them by an outrageous failure to comport with standards of con-
duct established either in a collective agreement or in the implementation
of an industrial relations system governed by the agreement, their action
should be preempted. Using standards developed by a particular em-
ployer bilaterally with a collective bargaining agent to judge that em-
237. Compare Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 484
U.S. 908 (1987) with Shane v. Greyhound Lines, 868 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1989) (claim based on
discharge notice required by collective agreement must be preempted). See also Hasten v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 640 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1981) (federal law provides absolute privilege for statements
in grievance proceedings). But see Thompson v. Public Serv. Co., 135 LRRM 2919 (Colo. 1990)
(qualified privilege sufficient to avoid preemption).
238. A collective agreement could of course incorporate state defamation law that would other-
wise be preempted, perhaps with a qualifying privilege, just as collective agreements could incorpo-
rate any other state law that should be presumptively preempted because of the possibility of
discouragement of collective bargaining.
239. This basis for the Ninth Circuit's position should not be precluded by the Supreme Court's
decision in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). Linn held that state law
actions for malicious defamation by union organizers were not preempted by the NLRA. For rea-
sons given in Justice Fortas' compelling dissent, id. at 69-74, Linn was probably wrongly decided. In
any event, since it did not involve statements made in collectively bargained processes, it did not
implicate the concern addressed in the text.
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ployer's behavior under state law could discourage the bilateral
negotiation of more stringent standards of potential benefit to employees.
There should also be preemption of any claim that an employer has in-
tentionally inflicted emotional distress by some outrageous or unreasona-
ble implementation of a grievance-arbitration system or other processes
expressly or implicitly required by a collective agreement. 240 Permitting
such claims against the implementation of agreed-upon processes, like
permitting misrepresentation or defamation claims against such imple-
mentation, could also increase the difficulty of establishing an employer's
duties to provide potentially beneficial processes.
However, employees should be able to use any available state law
standards of outrageousness or unreasonableness that would be applied
to nonunion employers to attack a unionized employer's conduct not in
discharge of bilaterally established duties. A state law action that de-
pends in no way on the existence of such duties cannot discourage their
negotiation. Contrary to law established in the Ninth Circuit24' and ac-
cepted by several other courts as well, 242 the possibility that the collective
agreement was intended to modify any state law right to reasonable con-
duct by providing different standards of reasonableness should not con-
stitute a sufficient basis for preemption. As explained above in the
discussion of the Jackson drug testing case,243 an employer's contention
that a collective agreement has compromised a state law right should
never be the basis for the preemption of claims based on that right. State
law should determine whether a right it creates independent of a private
contract should be negotiable, and if so, how it might be modified. And
any limits placed by state law on the negotiability of a right that is not
conditioned on an employer's provision of some other right, is not pre-
empted by federal law under the Oliver-Machinists precedent. 244
240. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1989) and Detomaso v. Pan
Am Airways, 43 Ca. 2d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987) may provide examples.
241. See, e.g., Edelman v. Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1989); Newberry v.
Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1988); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Ci. 1988). But see Galvez v. Kuhn,
933 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1991).
242. See, e.g., McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1991); Johnson
v. Beatrice Foods, 921 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F. 2d
1250 (5th Cir. 1990); Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1989); Douglas v. American
Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1989); Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers of
Akron, Inc., 850 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1988); Humphreys v. Pie Nationwide Inc., 723 F. Supp. 780
(N.D. Ga. 1989). But see Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990); Krashua v.
Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1990); O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.
1989); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (all appropriately
finding no preemption).
243. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
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Consider, for instance, the leading Ninth Circuit case, Miller v. AT
& T Network Systems.245 Daryl Miller alleged that although AT & T
was aware that high heat affected his heart beat and caused him to lose
consciousness, it persisted in assigning him to work in Mesa, Arizona in
over ninety degree weather, subjecting him to further fainting spells.
Miller apparently did not base his intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim on any standard of behavior required by the collective agree-
ment. However, the Ninth Circuit held that his claim must be
preempted because in its view the governing Oregon state law would per-
mit the agreement to define whether Miller's job assignments were so-
cially tolerable, regardless of whether these assignments would have been
acceptable in the absence of the agreement. The court indicated that
only emotional distress claims resting on state law that provides
mandatory (Le., nonnegotiable) as well as independent standards of ac-
ceptable behavior can escape preemption. 246
This holding means that Miller had to forfeit a right of action that
he might have enjoyed had he not been "protected" by a collective agree-
ment, not because the collective agreement has been interpreted to qual-
ify or waive that right, but rather because it might be so interpreted. 247
Worse, Miller is offered no channel to determine whether the collective
agreement was in fact intended to modify a state right, rather than just
not to create any additional private law right. As explained above,248
absolutely no federal labor law policy expressed in the development of
uniform section 301 law, or in other labor law preemption doctrine, re-
quires this perverse result. Like the drug testing cases represented by the
Jackson decision, intentional infliction of emotional distress cases like
Miller illustrate well why the section 301 preemption law articulated in
Lingle must be clarified.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON OVERLAPPING
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
I recognize that the clarifying restriction of section 301 preemption
advocated in this essay, even when supplemented with a partial reinvigo-
ration of the Oliver precedent, exposes employers to the potential of more
multiple attacks in multiple fora against the same challenged conduct. I
245. 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
246. Id. at 550-51 and n.5.
247. See also Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 572 n.10 (7th
Cir. 1989) (preemption if right of action is "arguably sanctioned" by labor contract).
248. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
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also appreciate that employers can argue that efficient and fair employ-
ment regulation requires the avoidance of such duplication.
Such arguments, however, should be made to state courts and legis-
latures fashioning minimum employment rights, and to unions negotiat-
ing arbitration clauses, not to state and federal courts applying federal
labor law preemption doctrine. As the Court in both Lingle and Metro-
politan Life recognized, there is nothing in federal labor law that pre-
vents a state from attempting to address the same perceived flaws in
unregulated employment relationships that might be addressed through
collective bargaining. Duplication in part results from the plural sources
of enforceable obligations in our public-private federal legal system.249
Furthermore, the provision of multiple actions may be quite rational for
policymakers hoping to ensure more certain elimination of particular em-
ployment practices, and perhaps convinced that regulatory underenforce-
ment is more likely or at least more costly than regulatory
overenforcement. 250
Employers nonetheless should be able to avoid exposure to multiple
actions against the same conduct by convincing either state lawmaking
bodies or unions that duplicative protection of employees is not neces-
sary. Note first how an employer might avoid duplicative litigation
through collective bargaining. Federal labor law must protect the au-
thority of employers and unions to condition access to an arbitration sys-
tem of their own creation on a grievant's willingness to waive any state
law cause of action arising from the same circumstances. This must be
true even for state actions to protect nonnegotiable and unconditional
state law rights that cannot be preempted by federal labor law. It is con-
ceivable that state law would condemn any denial of a generally available
arbitration remedy to employees who refuse to sacrifice a nonnegotiable
state right as retaliation for the assertion of such a right. But federal law,
under the Oliver-Machinists precedent, could supercede such a condem-
nation as an unacceptable discouragement of the negotiation of arbitra-
tion systems. Denying access to an arbitration system to those employees
who retain an alternative remedy under state law can be defended as a
249. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974) (the lower courts "rea-
soned that to permit an employee to have his claim considered in both the arbitral and judicial
forums would be unfair since this would mean that the employer, but not the employee, was bound
by the arbitral award .... But in instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking
review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbi-
tration process.").
250. See S. ESTREICHER & M. HARPER, THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELA-
TIONSHIP, 883-84 (West 1990).
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rational allocation of a privately negotiated costly employee benefit.25 1
Consider further how state lawmaking bodies might integrate the
rights or remedies they create with those that might be provided in col-
lective agreements. One option would be to deny the state law remedy to
those employees with a significant alternative remedy under a collective
bargaining agreement. 252 This option might be challenged under the Oli-
ver-Machinists precedent as a discouragement of the negotiation of the
benefit of an arbitration remedy. If the state law provides a more attrac-
tive remedy than would arbitration, unions might insist that any arbitra-
tion clause exclude employees who might claim the state law remedy.
However, this is not the type of impact on collective bargaining that fed-
eral labor law should preclude. Unlike the antitrust prohibition struck
down in Oliver or the tort action preempted in Lueck, this option would
not impede unions obtaining a benefit that they determine would enhance
the situation of represented employees. It would only make it less likely
that unions would view arbitration as such a benefit in all circumstances;
it would encourage, not discourage employers agreeing to arbitration.
Federal labor laws framed to facilitate collective employee choice of en-
hanced benefits should not be read to prevent state law from giving un-
ions the option of choosing between a minimum statutory benefit and a
collectively bargained alternative. 253 This conclusion, moreover, is sup-
251. For this reason even federal minimum employee rights legislation containing antiretaliation
provisions, such as that embodied in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (anti-retaliation clause), also should not condemn collective bargaining agreements that force
grievants to choose between statutory and contractual remedies. There is nothing in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), to the contrary. In that case the Court did reiterate that
individual employees cannot be forced to waive statutory rights as a condition for the utilization of
other rights secured in a collective agreement free of such a condition. Id. at 51-52. However, both
the Court's language and its citation of J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), make clear that its
concern was detracting from collective bargaining, not the qualification of a contractual right negoti-
ated through such bargaining.
Unions must be concerned that they do not breach their duty of fair representation through
special treatment of any group of employees that might be protected by independent statutes. How-
ever, allocating scarce arbitration resources only to those who do not have or elect not to use an
alternative statutory remedy should be sufficiently rational and benign to sustain a fair representa-
tion challenge, even accepting the active antidiscrimination role apparently envisioned for unions by
the Court in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (Title VII condemns union's refusal
to file discrimination grievances because of fear of employer reaction).
252. State law could judge the adequacy of any remedy under the collective agreement. The
state would not have to defer to federal law because it would not be using the collective agreement to
augment any obligations that an employer would have under state law in the absence of the agree-
ment. Even a state right that could not be claimed if an employee's grievance was "arbitrable" under
a collective agreement would not have to be applied in accordance with the Warrior & Gulf pre-
sumption of substantive arbitrability. The state would probably want to apply this section 301 pre-
sumption, but there is no reason why it should have to if it wished to give a broader or narrower
scope to the right it has created.
253. Federal law, however, might conceivably require any denial of a state law remedy to be
dependent upon a clear and unequivocal statement in the collective agreement that reflects the
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ported by the Court's decision in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 254
not to preempt a Maine law requiring a minimum level of severance pay-
ments to employees laid off because of a plant closing only in the absence
of a contract providing for severance pay.255
A second option would be to require employees with access to a
collectively bargained grievance arbitration system to exhaust that sys-
tem and to accept any factual determinations it makes before attempting
any state law claim. 25 6 If this option only makes an employee's assertion
of a state remedy more difficult it no more conflicts with the goals of
federal law than does the first option. It is simply another way to require
the union to choose between complete protection by state processes and
protection through the arbitral system.257
A strong Oliver-Machinists challenge might be made to a third more
radical option for the integration of state law remedies with those that
might derive from collective bargaining-the state's absolute denial of its
right or remedy to any union-represented employee or at least any em-
ployee covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 258  This option
would prevent a union from choosing state law rights and remedies as
preferable to those that it could negotiate in a private agreement. By
thereby penalizing employees for their choice of union representation,
union's recognition of its waiver of the state law remedy. The purpose of such a law would be to
protect collective negotiations from the burden of unions being worried about the unintentional
waiver of state law-created employee rights. See supra note 109.
254. 482 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1987).
255. See id. at 22 ("The fact that the parties are free to devise their own severance pay arrange-
ments, however, strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on collective bargaining
.... If a statute that permits no collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA pre-emption, see
Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining cannot be pre-empted").
A fortiori, there should be no preemption of the more common state statutory provisions that
provide minimum protections or benefits to employees, but allow collective bargaining agreements to
provide more generous protections or benefits. See, eg., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.91(2)(f) (West 1989
Supp.) ("Nothing in this paragraph prohibits the employer from bargaining on rights to family leave
or medical leave which are more generous to the employee .... ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26 § 681
(Supp. 1989) (permitting greater protection from substance abuse testing); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 175
§ 1106 (1988) (permitting collective agreement to require longer continuation of health insurance
after plant closing).
256. For instance, in Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 881 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir.
1989), the Fourth Circuit interpreted Maryland law to require a grievant seeking damages for a
retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim to first prevail in an arbitration pro-
ceeding under the collective agreement governing his bargaining unit.
257. However, if the state permits an arbitral finding to be used against an employer as well as
against an employee grievant, it may make the arbitral process more expensive for employers and
thereby discourage its negotiation. Such discouragement should be grounds for preemption under
the Oliver-Machinists precedent.
258. This option was elected in the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of
1987, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 914. This Act "does not apply to a discharge ... of an
employee covered by a written collective bargaining agreement or a written contract of employment
for a specific term." Id. at § 39-2-912.
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this approach could discourage that choice and any collective bargaining
which it could support. 259
Yet I am not convinced that this approach should necessarily be
preempted by federal law. First, collective bargaining arguably could be
encouraged as much by the decrease in employer resistance to unioniza-
tion that might follow upon exempting union employees from state law,
as it would be directly discouraged by such exemptions.26° More impor-
tantly, states might have strong reasons for not extending certain rights
and remedies to employees represented by collective bargaining agents.
A state might require nonunionized employment relationships to provide
certain employee rights, such as protection from arbitrary dismissal, not
primarily or at least solely because of a collective (and for many paternal-
istic) determination that all employees in our society should have these
rights. A state's requirement of minimum employee rights might instead,
or at least in addition, rest on a determination that such rights would
normally be freely negotiated by sophisticated employees not frustrated
by individual employees' difficulty purchasing collective goods (such as
arbitration systems), as well as by generally limited bargaining lever-
age.261 Whether or not one agrees that these market-correction and re-
distributive purposes for particular minimum employee rights are
persuasive, 262 it certainly is rational for a state to conclude that they do
not extend to employees represented by experienced unions whose exclu-
sive bargaining status may provide both adequate bargaining leverage
and a solution to the free-rider dilemma that burdens an individual em-
ployee's negotiation of a collective benefit.263
259. Cf. supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755 (1985) ("Minimum state labor standards affect union and nonunion
employees equally, and neither encourage nor discourage the collective-bargaining processes that are
the subject of the NLRA."). Professor Herman therefore believes that this third state option should
be preempted. See Herman, supra note 26, at 649 at n.263.
260. See Weiler, Promises to Keep, Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983) (arguing that increased employer resistance to unionization
in part explains decline in union density); R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 221-
245 (Basic Books 1983) (summary and analysis of empirical support for this proposition).
261. See generally P. WEILER, THE LAW GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (Harvard Univ. 1990);
S. ESTREICHER & M. HARPER, THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, 759-78
(West 1990); Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory
and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REv. 101, 125-34 (1988).
262. For an example of a dissenting view, see Freed & Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules
and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989).
263. A fourth option that a state legislature might choose to avoid duplicative litigation under its
public law and that of a collective agreement, however, should be subject to preemption under the
Oliver-Machinists precedent. New York's whistleblower protection law, for instance, provides that
"the institution of an action in accordance with this section shall be deemed a waiver of the rights
and remedies available under any . . . collective bargaining agreement .... " N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 740(7). State law can control the remedial processes it creates, but not those created by a collective
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For me as a hypothetical lawmaker, the above analysis would not be
sufficient to justify an unequal treatment of union and nonunion employ-
ees. However, in contrast to what appears the predilection of many
judges, I resist clothing my political preferences in preemption doctrine.
At least since the Taft-Hartley amendments, the federal labor laws do
not so clearly favor the establishment of collective representation as to
preempt any state law that might influence employees to reject such rep-
resentation. What these laws do clearly do, on the other hand, is to pro-
tect from state encroachment any collective bargaining that is chosen by
employees. In this essay I have argued that this protection should be the
linchpin of doctrine defining which state law provisions of minimum em-
ployee rights must be preempted, whether through section 301 presump-
tions or the Oliver-Machinists precedent I have attempted to invigorate.
agreement. Restricting access to the latter because of utilization of the former frustrates unions'
negotiation of a particular benefit through collective bargaining almost as directly as did Ohio in the
Oliver case. New York should thus be satisfied to provide that the initiation of a remedy available
under a collective agreement constitutes a waiver of the rights and remedies provided by its
whistleblower law.
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